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Abstract
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over
resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several
settings including scheduling, cloud computing, and communicating over a network. This model is quite
different from the traditional models, to the extent that neither do the classical equilibrium existence
results seem to apply to it nor do any of the efficient algorithmic techniques developed to compute
equilibria seem to apply directly. We give a proof of existence of equilibrium and a polynomial time
algorithm for finding one, drawing heavily on techniques from LP duality and submodular minimization.
We observe that in our market model, the set of equilibrium prices could be a connected, non-convex set
(see figure below). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first natural example of the phenomenon
where the set of solutions could have such complicated structure, yet there is a combinatorial polynomial
time algorithm to find one. Finally, we show that our model inherits many of the fairness properties of
traditional equilibrium models.
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Figure 1: An example of a non-convex set of equilibria. See Table 2 for an explanation.
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1 Introduction
In a free market economy, prices naturally tend to find an “equilibrium” under which there is parity between
supply and demand. The power of this pricing mechanism is well explored and understood in economics:
It allocates resources efficiently since prices send strong signals about what is wanted and what is not, and
it prevents artificial scarcity of goods while at the same time ensuring that goods that are truly scarce are
conserved [38]. In addition, it ensures that the allocation of goods is Pareto optimal. Hence it is beneficial
to both consumers and producers. Furthermore, equilibrium-based mechanisms have been designed even
for certain applications which do not involve any exchange of money but require fairness properties such as
envy-freeness and the sharing incentive property; a popular one being CEEI1 [41]. Today, with the surge of
markets on the Internet, in which pricing and allocation are done in a centralized manner via computation,
an obvious question arises: can we apply insights gained from traditional markets to these new markets to
accrue similar benefits? This (in addition to other motivations) has led to a long line of work in the TCS
community on the computation of economic equilibria; see Appendix A for more details.
In this paper, we define a broad class of market models that are appropriate for modeling several new
markets, including scheduling, cloud computing, and bandwidth allocation in networks. A common feature
of our markets is that these are resource allocation markets in which each agent desires a specific amount
of resources to complete a task, i.e., each agent has a covering constraint. If the agent does not get all the
resources requested, then she will not be able to complete the task and hence has no value for this partial
allocation. With several agents vying for the same set of resources, a new parameter that becomes crucially
important is the delay experienced by agents. This naturally leads to a definition of supply and demand, as
well as pricing and allocation, based on temporal considerations.
We define an equilibrium-based model for pricing and allocation in these markets. Our model is funda-
mentally different from traditional market models: Each agent needs only a bounded amount of resources to
finish her tasks and has no use for more, and her utility, which corresponds to the delay she experiences, also
has a finite maximum value, i.e., her “utility function” satiates. On the other hand, traditional models satisfy
non-satiation, i.e., no matter what bundle of goods an agent gets, there is a way of giving her additional
goods so her utility strictly increases. Non-satiation turns out to be a key assumption in the Arrow-Debreu
Theorem, which established existence of equilibrium in traditional markets. Despite this, we manage to
give an existence proof for our model. Additionally, we prove that all the above-stated benefits of equilibria,
including the fairness properties of CEEI, continue to hold for our model.
We next address the issue of computing equilibria in our model. Rubinstein [47] recently showed that
computing an equilibrium in our general model is PPAD-hard. For this reason, we defined a sub-model
for which we seek an efficient algorithm. This sub-model is of interest in applications, including the three
mentioned above. However, it turns out that equilibria of this sub-model have a different structure than
those of models for which polynomial time algorithms have been designed. For instance, we give examples
in which the set of equilibrium prices is non-convex. Hence techniques used for designing polynomial
time algorithms for traditional models, such as the primal-dual method and convex programming, are not
applicable. Our algorithms are based on new ideas: we make heavy use of LP duality and the way optimal
solutions to LPs change with changes in certain parameters. Submodular minimization, combined with
binary search, is used as a subroutine in this process.
In summary, for the main applications stated above, our market-based model admits equilibrium prices,
which can moreover be computed in polynomial time and we show that our algorithm is incentive compat-
ible. In addition, the equilibrium allocations satisfy a range of fairness properties. Considering the many
favorable properties of market-based models and the availability of massive computing power for computing
equilibria, we believe they will play an important role in markets on the Internet.
1Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes
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Organization. We define the market model and state our main results in Section 2. In this section, we
define the notions of strong feasibility, under which we establish existence of equilibrium, and extensibility,
which gives the sub-model for which we give a polynomial time algorithm. We also discuss properties of
fairness and incentive compatibility of our solution. In Section 3 we describe the algorithm for a special
case in a scheduling setting, in order to convey the main ideas. The algorithm in its full generality, and
an overview of the analysis are in Section 4. Section 5 contains all the different examples referred to, and
also a description of a run of the algorithm for some examples. The appendices contain more details on
related work (A), special cases of our model (D), existence of equilibria (C), connection of our algorithm to
Myerson’s ironing in the scheduling case (B), equilibrium characterization for the general model (E), proofs
missing from the main paper (F), and fairness and incentive compatibility properties (G).
2 Model and Main Results
We introduce a combinatorial version of the well studied Fisher market model [6, 19]. In market M, let
A be a set of n agents, indexed by i, and G be a set of m divisible goods, indexed by j. We represent an
allocation of goods to agents using the variables xij ∈ R+, i ∈ A, j ∈ G. Each agent i ∈ A wants to
procure goods that satisfy a set of covering constraints, C, where C is a set indexing the constraints (C is
the same for all agents for ease of notation).
∀ k ∈ C,∑j∈G aijkxij ≥ rik, and ∀ j ∈ G, xij ≥ 0 (CC(i))
The objective of each agent is to minimize the “delay” she experiences, while meeting these constraints.
We refer to the term dij as the delay faced by agent i on using good j, and the terms riks as the “re-
quirements”; dijs and riks are assumed to be non-negative. Agent i wants an allocation that optimizes the
following LP.
min
∑
j∈G dijxij s.t. (Delay LP(i))
∀ k ∈ C,∑j∈G aijkxij ≥ rik.
∀ j ∈ G, xij ≥ 0.
We use the notation di := (dij)j∈G, ri := (rik)k∈C , Ai := (aijk)j∈G,k∈C , xi := (xij)j∈G, and
X := (xi)i∈A. Although our results hold for any LP, the most interesting cases are when the constraints are
covering constraints, i.e., the matrix Ai has only non-negative entries.
We will use a market mechanism to allocate resources. Let pj ∈ R+ denote the price per unit amount
of good j, and assume agent i has a total budget of mi ∈ R+. Then, as is standard in Fisher markets, the
bundle xi that the agent may purchase is restricted by,∑
j∈G pjxij ≤ mi. (Budget constraint(i))
Allocation xi is an optimal allocation (bundle) of agent i relative to prices p := (pj)j∈G, if it optimizes LP
(Delay LP(i)) with an additional budget constraint (Budget constraint(i)). Each good has a given supply
which, after normalization, may be assumed to be equal to 1. The allocation needs to be supply respecting,
that is, it has to satisfy the supply constraints:
∀ j ∈ G,∑i∈A xij ≤ 1. (Supply constraints)
Finally, a supply respecting allocation X and prices p are a market equilibrium ofM iff
1. Each agent gets an optimal allocation relative to prices p.
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2. If some good j ∈ G is not fully allocated, i.e.,∑i∈A xij < 1, then pj = 0.
The equilibrium condition requires that each agent does the best for herself, regardless of what the other
agents do or even what the supply constraints are. From the perspective of the goods, the aim is market
clearing (rather than, say, profit maximization)2. Some goods may not have sufficient demand and therefore
we may not be able to clear them. This is handled by requiring these goods to be priced at zero.
In Theorem 3 we obtain characterization of equilibrium in this general model in terms of solutions of a
parameterized linear program that has one parameter per agent.
2.1 Existence of equilibria.
We show how the above model is a special case of the classic Arrow-Debreu market model with quasi-
concave utility functions in Appendix C.1. Unfortunately, these utility functions do not satisfy the “non-
satiation” condition required by the Arrow-Debreu theorem for the existence of an equilibrium: utility does
not increase beyond a point even if additional goods are allocated. In fact, equilibrium doesn’t always exist
for all covering LPs, as shown via a simple example in Section 5, Figure 3. And therefore next we identify
conditions under which it does exist; the example in Figure 3 shows how this condition is necessary.
The equilibrium condition requires at a minimum that there exists a supply respecting allocation that
also satisfies CC(i) of all the agents. In fact, it is easy to see that a somewhat stronger feasibility condition
is necessary: suppose that a subset of agents all have high budgets while the remaining agents have budgets
that are close to 0. Then at an equilibrium, agents in the former set get their “best” goods, which means that
whatever supply remains must be sufficient to allocate a feasible bundle for the remaining agents.
We require a similar condition for all minimally feasible allocations, i.e., an allocation xi such that
reducing amount of any good would make CC(i) infeasible. We call this condition strong feasibility.
Definition 1 (Strong feasibility). MarketM satisfies strong feasibility if any minimally feasible and supply
respecting solution to a subset of agents can be extended to a feasible and supply respecting allocation to
the entire set. Formally, ∀ S ⊂ A, and ∀ (xi)i∈S that are minimally feasible for (CC(i))i∈S and are supply
respecting (with xij = 0 ∀ i ∈ Sc), ∃ solutions (xi)i∈Sc that are feasible for (CC(i))i∈Sc and (xi)i∈(S∪Sc)
is supply respecting.
Theorem 1. [Strong feasibility implies existence of an equilibrium] If (CC(i))i∈A of market M satisfies
strong feasibility, then ∃ an allocation X and prices p that constitute a market equilibrium ofM.
The proof of this theorem is in Appendix C. Strong feasibility is quite general in the following sense:
it is satisfied if there is a “default” good that has a large enough capacity and may have a large delay but
occurs in every constraint with a positive coefficient. In other words, any agent’s covering constraints may
all be met by allocating sufficient quantity of the default good.
2.2 Efficient computation.
Ideally we would want to design an efficient algorithm for markets with Strong feasibility condition, however
this problem turns out to be PPAD-hard [47]. In order to circumvent this hardness, we define a stronger
condition called extensibility, and design a polynomial time algorithm to compute a market equilibrium
under it. Extensibility requires that any “optimal allocation” to a subset of agents can be “extended” to an
“optimal allocation” for a set that includes one extra agent. Hence this is a matroid like condition. For this
we first formally define “optimal allocation” for a subset of agents.
2However, our algorithm will find an equilibrium where every agent spends all of her budget, and thereby it maximizes the profit
automatically.
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Definition 2. For any subset of agents S ⊆ A, we say that an allocation X is jointly optimal for S if (i) it
satisfies (CC(i))i∈S , (ii) it is supply respecting, and (iii) it minimizes
∑
i∈S di · xi. (Observe that X may
not be optimal for individual agents in S.)
Definition 3 (Extensibility). Market M satisfies extensibility if ∀ S ⊂ A, given an allocation X that is
jointly optimal for S, the following holds: for any i ∈ Sc, ∃ an allocation X ′ that is jointly optimal for
S′ = S ∪{i}, while not changing the delay of the agents in S, i.e., di ·x′i = di ·xi, ∀i ∈ S. In other words,
total delay cost of agents in S′ can be minimized without changing the delay cost of agents in S.
Extensibility seems somewhat stronger than strong feasibility, but the two conditions are formally in-
comparable; see example in Section 5, Figure 3. In Section 2.3 we show that extensibility condition captures
many interesting problems as special cases. Another mild condition we need is that there is enough demand
for goods from each agent, otherwise an agent with very little requirement but huge amount of money may
drive everyone else out of the market.
Definition 4 (Sufficient Demand). MarketM satisfies sufficient demand if under zero prices, the optimal
bundle of each agent contains some good that is demanded more than its supply, i.e., for an optimal solution
xi to (Delay LP(i)), there exists a good j such that xij > 1.
Even for very simple markets, e.g., Tables 1 and 2 in Section 5, the set of equilibria may turn out
to be highly non-convex. Therefore techniques used to obtain polynomial time algorithms for traditional
models are not applicable. In Section 4 we design a polynomial time algorithm by making a heavy use of
parameterized LP, duality and submodular minimization, and obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. [Extensibility and sufficient demand implies polynomial time algorithm] There is a polynomial
time algorithm that computes a market equilibrium allocation X and prices p for any market M that
satisfies extensibility and sufficient demand.
Since the algorithm is quite involved, we first convey the main ideas through a special case of scheduling
in Section 3. We show the run of the main algorithm on an example in Section 5, Figure 5.
2.3 Applications
As a consequence of the above theorem we get polynomial time algorithms for the following special cases.
(The proofs that these satisfy extensibility are in Appendix D.)
Scheduling. The agents are jobs that require d different types of machines, and the set of machines of
type k is Mk; the machines are the goods in the market. Each agent needs rik ∈ R+ units of machines
in all of type k, which is captured by the covering constraint
∑
j∈Mk xijk ≥ rik, ∀k ∈ [d]. All agents
experience the same delay djk from machine j in type k. Assume that the number of machines in each type
k is greater than the total requirements of the agents,
∑
i∈A rik. In reality different machines in this model
may represent actually different machines, or the same machine at different times. The main motivation for
this problem is scheduling in the cloud computing context, but it also captures other client-server scenarios
such as crowdsourcing. An earlier version of this paper designed an algorithm only for this case [20].
Even for this simple case with only one type, we observe that the set of equilibria may form a connected
non-convex set. The non-convexity example shown in Section 5, Tables 1 and 2, are instances of this setting.
Restricted assignment with laminar families – Different arrival times. The above basic scheduling
setting can be generalized to the following restricted assignment case, where job i is allowed to be processed
only on a subset of all the machines Sik ⊆Mk for type k. We need the Siks to form a laminar3 family within
3A family of subsets is said to be laminar if any two sets S and T in the family are either disjoint, S ∩ T = ∅, or contained in
one another, S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S.
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each type, and in addition, we require that the machines in a larger subset have lower delays. That is, if for
some two agents i, i′ ∈ A, Si′k ⊂ Sik then maxj∈Sik\Si′k djk ≤ minj′∈Si′k dj′k for each type k. This helps
to model the important condition in the cloud computing context that jobs may arrive at different times.
Network Flows. The goods are edges in a network, where each edge e has a certain (fixed) delay de. Each
agent i wants to send ri units of flow from a source si to a sink ti, and minimize her own delay (which is a
min-cost flow problem). We show that if the network is series-parallel and the source-sink pair is common
to all agents, then the instance satisfies extensibility. This is similar to the basic scheduling example in that
there is a sequence of paths of increasing delay, but the difference here is that we need to price edges and
not paths. The difficulty is that paths share edges and hence the edge prices should be co-ordinated in such
a way that the path prices are as desired. There are networks that are not series-parallel but still the instance
satisfies extensibility. We show one such network (and also how our algorithm runs on it) in Figure 5 on
page 16. For a general network, an equilibrium may not exist; we give such an example in Figure 3.
A generalization of all these special cases that still satisfies extensibility is as follows: take any number
of independent copies of any of these special cases above. E.g., each agent might want some machines for
job processing, as well as send some flows through a network or a set of networks, but have a common
budget for both together. Our algorithm works for all such cases.
2.4 Properties of equilibria
Fairness: We first discuss an application of our market model to fair division of goods, where there are no
monetary transfers involved. This captures scenarios where the goods to be shared are commonly owned,
such as the computing infrastructure of a large company to be shared among its users. A standard fair
division mechanism is competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) [41]. This mechanism uses an
equilibrium allocation corresponding to an instance of the market where all the agents have the same budget.
This can be generalized to a weighted version, where different agents are assigned different budgets based
on their importance.
The fairness of such an allocation mechanism follows from the following properties of equilibria shown
in Appendix G.1 for the general model. 1. The equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal; this an analog of
the first welfare theorem for our model. 2. The allocation is envy-free; since each agent gets the optimal
bundle given the prices and the budget, he doesn’t envy the allocation of any other agent. 3. Each agent gets
a “fair share”: the equilibrium allocation Pareto-dominates an “equal share” allocation, where each agent
gets an equal amount of each resource. This property is also known as sharing incentive in the scheduling
literature [29]. 4. Incentive compatibility (IC): the equilibrium allocation is incentive compatible “in the
large”, where no single agent is large enough to significantly affect the equilibrium prices. In this case, the
agents are essentially price takers, and hence the allocation is IC. We also show a version of IC when the
market is not large. We discuss this in more detail below.
Incentive Compatibility: In the quasi-linear utility model, an agent maximizes the valuation of the goods
she gets minus the payment. In the presence of budget constraints, Dobzinski et al. [21] show that no
anonymous4 IC mechanism can also be Pareto optimal, even when there are just two different goods. In
the context of our model, a quasi-linear utility function specifies an “exchange rate” between delay and
payments, and wants to minimize a linear combination of the two. We show in Appendix G.3 that the
impossibility extends to our model via an easy reduction to the case of Dobzinski et al. [21].
In the face of this impossibility, we show the following second best guarantee in Appendix G.2. For the
scheduling application mentioned above, we show that our algorithm as a market based mechanism is IC
4Anonymity is a very mild restriction, which disallows favoring any agent based on the identity.
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in the following sense: non-truthful reporting of mi and riks can never result in an allocation with a lower
delay. A small modification to the payments, keeping the allocation the same, makes the entire mechanism
incentive compatible for the model in which agents want to first minimize their delay and subject to that,
minimize their payments.
The first incentive compatibility assumes that utility of the agents is only the delay, and does not de-
pend on the money spent (or saved). Such utility functions have been considered in the context of online
advertising [5, 23, 42]. It is a reflection of the fact that companies often have a given budget for procuring
compute resources, and the agents acting on their behalf really have no incentive to save any part of this
budget. In the fair allocation context (CEEI), this gives a truly IC mechanism, since the mis are determined
exogenously, and hence are not private information.
The second incentive compatibility does take payments into account, but gives a strict preference to
delay over payments. Such preferences are also seen in the online advertising world, where advertisers want
as many clicks as possible, and only then want to minimize payments. The modifications required for this
are minimal, and essentially change the payment from a “first price” to a “second price” wherever required.
3 Scheduling on a single machine
Our algorithm for the general setting is quite involved, therefore we first present it for a very special case in
a scheduling setting mentioned in Section 2.3. The basic building blocks and the structure of the algorithm
and the analysis are reflected in this case. In Section 5, we describe the run of this algorithm on the example
in Table 1. We note that the formal proofs are given only for the general case and not for this section.
Suppose that there is just one machine and a good is this machine at a certain time t ∈ Z+, which we
refer to as slot t. The set of goods is therefore G = Z+ and we index the goods by t instead of j as before.
Further, assume that the delay of slot t is just t, i.e., ∀ i ∈ A, dit = t. Each agent i requires a certain number
of slots to be allocated to her, as captured by the covering constraint
∑
t∈Z+ xit ≥ ri, for some ri ∈ Z+.
We denote the sum of the requirements over a subset S ⊆ A of agents as r(S) := ∑i∈S ri. Recall that
the budget of agent i is mi, and similarly m(S) :=
∑
i∈Smi. We will show that equilibrium prices are
characterized by the following conditions.5
1. The prices form a piecewise linear convex decreasing curve. Let the linear pieces (segments) of this
curve be numbered 1, 2, . . . , k, . . ., from right to left.
2. There is a partitioning of the agents into sets S1, S2, . . . , Sk, . . . , where the number of slots in kth
segment is r(Sk). Note that since ris are integers so are the r(Sk)s.
3. The sum of the prices of slots in kth segment equals m(Sk).
4. For any S ⊂ Sk, the total price of the first r(S) slots of the segment ≥ m(S), since otherwise these
slots would be over demanded. This is equivalent to saying that the total price of the last r(S) slots in
this segment ≤ m(S).
The above only characterizes equilibrium prices. We will show that Conditions 3 and 4 imply that there
exists an allocation of the slots in segment k to the agents in Sk such that both their requirements and
budget constraints are satisfied. Such allocations can then be found by solving the following feasibility LP
(1). In this LP, segment k corresponds to the interval [T k, T k−1].
5For how this equilibrium characterization leads to an analogy with Myerson’s ironing for a special case of this setting, with
ri = 1 for all i ∈ A, see Appendix B.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to compute market equilibrium for scheduling
1: Input: A, (mi)i∈A, (ri)i∈A
2: Initialize A′ ← A, plow ← 0, T 0 ← r(A) + 1,∀ t ≥ T 0, pt ← 0 and k ← 1
3: while A′ 6= ∅ do
4: Sk ← NextSeg(plow, A′, (mi)i∈A′ , (ri)i∈A′)
5: λSk ← 2m(S
k)−plowr(Sk)
r(Sk)(r(Sk)+1)
6: T k ← T k−1 − r(Sk)
7: ∀ t ∈ [T k, T k−1], set pt ← plow + (T k−1 − t)λSk
8: Compute allocations xi for all i ∈ Sk by solving LP (1)
9: Update plow ← pTk , A′ ← A′ \ Sk, and k ← k + 1
10: end while
11: Output allocations X and prices p.
∀ i ∈ Sk : ∑t∈[Tk,Tk−1] xit ≥ ri
∀ i ∈ Sk : ∑t∈[Tk,Tk−1] ptxit ≤ mi
∀ t ∈ [T k, T k−1] : ∑i∈Sk xit ≤ 1
∀ i ∈ Sk,∀ t ∈ [T k, T k−1] : xit ≥ 0
(1)
We now describe the algorithm, which is formally defined in Algorithm 1. It iteratively computes Sk,
starting from k = 1: the last segment that corresponds to the latest slots is computed first, and then the
segment to its left, and so on. Inductively, suppose we have computed segments numbered 1 up to k−1. Let
plow be the price of the earliest slot in segment k− 1, and let A′ = A \ {S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk−1}. For any S ⊆ A′,
consider the sum of the prices of r(S) consecutive slots to the left of this slot, forming a line segment with
slope −λ (see Figure 2); this sum is
plowr(S) + λ
r(S)(r(S)+1)
2 .
(ݎሺܣሻ+1)
Sum of prices 
ݎሺܵሻ
‐ߣ
݌௟௢௪
݌௟௢௪ ൅ ߣ
݌௟௢௪ ൅ ݎሺܵሻߣ
…
…
‐ߣଵ
0
Figure 2: Prices on a Segment for set S ⊆ A′
Then for any S, one can solve for the λ where this would be equal to m(S); we define this as a function
of S.
λS := 2
m(S)−plowr(S)
r(S)(r(S)+1) .
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Algorithm 2 Subroutine NextSeg(plow, A′, (mi)i∈A′ , (ri)i∈A′)
1: Initialize λ0 ← 0, λ1 ← maxi∈A′mi
2: Define fplow,λ(S) := m(S)− plowr(S)− λr(S)(r(S) + 1)/2
3: Set S0 ∈ arg minS⊆A′,S 6=∅ fplow,λ0(S) and S1 ∈ arg minS⊆A′,S 6=∅ fplow,λ1(S)
4: while S0 6= S1 do
5: Set λ∗ ← λ0+λ12 and S∗ ∈ arg minS⊆A′,S 6=∅ fplow,λ∗(S)
6: if fplow,λ∗(S∗) > 0 then Set λ0 ← λ∗ and S0 ← S∗
7: else Set λ1 ← λ∗ and S1 ← S∗
8: end if
9: end while
10: Return S0
The next segment is defined to be the one with the smallest slope:
Sk = NextSeg(plow, A′, (mi)i∈A′ , (ri)i∈A′) := arg minS⊆A′ λS .
With this definition of the next segment, and with prices for the corresponding slots set to be linear with
slope −λSk , it follows that Conditions 3 and 4 are satisfied.
It is not immediately clear how to minimize λS ; the function need not be submodular, for instance. The
main idea here is to do a binary search over λ, as defined in Algorithm 2. Consider the function fplow,λ as
defined in line 2 of this algorithm, and notice that fplow,λ is decreasing in λ. From the preceding discussion,
it follows that the segment S∗ we seek is such that fplow,λS∗ (S
∗) = 0 and ∀S ⊂ A, fplow,λS∗ (S) ≥ 0.
This implies that S∗ must minimize fplow,λS∗ over all subsets of A
′. Thus, given any λ and a minimizer of
fplow,λ, we can tell whether the desired λS∗ is above or below this λ, and a binary search gives us the desired
segment. A minimizer of fplow,λ can be found efficiently since this is (as we will show) a submodular
function.
In addition to the feasibility of LP (1), the main technical aspect of proving the correctness of the
algorithm is to show that each agent gets an optimal allocation. This follows essentially from showing
Condition 1, that the prices indeed form a piecewise linear convex curve, or equivalently, that the λks
form an increasing sequence. It is fairly straightforward to see that the running time of the algorithm is
polynomial.
4 Algorithm under Extensibility
In this section we present the algorithm that proves Theorem 2; we will parallel the presentation in Section
3. We first present equilibrium characterization for the general model in Theorem 3 (complete proof is in
Appendix E), and then describe the key ideas in designing the algorithm (the missing proofs and other details
of this part are in Appendix F). We show run of our algorithm on a network example in Section 5, Figure 5.
Recall that in our general model, each agent has a delay function and a set of constraints on the bundle
of goods she gets. Unlike in Section 3, there is no simple ordering among the goods that enables a geometric
description of an equilibrium, therefore some parts that are immediate in that setting may require a proof
here. Recall that the first step in Section 3 was to find an equilibrium characterization only in terms of prices.
This used the geometry of the instance in order to partition the time slots into segments. More generally,
it will be more convenient to consider a partition of agents rather than a partition of goods. By abuse of
terminology, in this section, by “segment” we refer to a subset of agents. Each agent i in A has a parameter
λi, that previously corresponded to the slope of the segment they were in. Similarly, now too, all agents in a
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segment Sk have the same λi. This will also correspond to the optimal dual variable for Budget constraint(i)
in the agent’s optimization problem at the equilibrium.
Given a vector of λis, denoted by λ ∈ R|A|+ , next we define a parameterized linear program and its
dual. Intuition for this definition comes from the optimal bundle LP of each agent at given prices. In
the following, LP (λ) has allocation variables xijs, the constraint CC(i) for each agent i, and the supply
respecting constraint for each good j. The corresponding dual variables are respectively αiks and pjs, where
pj can be thought of as the price for good j.
LP (λ) : DLP (λ) :
min :
∑
i λi
∑
j dijxij
s.t.
∑
j aijkxij ≥ rik, ∀(i, k)∑
i xij ≤ 1, ∀j
xij ≥ 0, ∀(i, j)
max :
∑
i,k rikαik −
∑
j pj
s.t. λidij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pj , ∀(i, j)
pj ≥ 0, ∀j; αik ≥ 0, ∀(i, k)
(2)
Remarkably, the next theorem shows that the problem of computing an equilibrium reduces to solving
the above LP and its dual for a right parameter vector λ ∈ R|A|+ .
Theorem 3. For a given λ > 0 if an optimal solution X of LP (λ) and an optimal solution (α,p) of
DLP (λ) satisfy Budget constraint(i) for all agents i ∈ A with equality, then they constitute an equilibrium
of marketM.
We note that the proof of Theorem 3 uses only complementary slackness conditions of optimal bundle
LP of each buyer, and therefore the theorem holds for the most general model, i.e., without any of the
extensibility, enough demand, or strong feasibility assumptions. Theorem 3 gives us the “geometry” of an
equilibrium outcome, and is roughly equivalent to Condition 1 from Section 3. It reduces the problem to
one of finding a right parameter vector λ; however there is still the entire R|A|+ to search from. As was done
in Section 3, our main goal is to further reduce this task to a sequence of single parameter searches, each
involving submodular minimization and binary search.
Theorem 3 is applicable when all agents spend exactly their money at a primal-dual pair of optimal
solutions for a given vector λ. Now the question is to characterize such parameter vectors λ. Note that,
there really is no equivalent of Condition 2 from Section 3, since some goods may be allocated across
agents in different segments. This is the source of many of the difficulties we face. Next, in Lemma 2, we
derive an (approximate) equivalent of Conditions 3 and 4 from Section 3. This guarantees the existence of
(allocation, prices) that satisfy the budget constraints of agents. One difference here is that this is going to
be a global condition that involves the entire vector λ, rather than a local condition that we could apply to
a single segment like in Section 3. For this we need a number of properties of optimal solutions of LP (λ)
and DLP (λ) that we show in Lemma 1 next.
Let us define delayi(X) =
∑
j dijxij and payi(p, X) =
∑
j pjxij . Similarly, for a subset of agents S ⊆
A, delayS(X) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j dijxij and payS(p, X) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j pjxij . Let [d] denote the set {1, . . . , d} of
indices. By abuse of notation, let us define
λ(S) =
{
the λ value of agents in S if all agents in S have the same λi.
undefined otherwise
.
Using extensibility, in the next lemma we show that optimal solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ) satisfy
some invariants regarding delays and payments of agents, e.g., we will show that higher the λ the better the
delay at primal optimal. For a fixed dual optimal the total payment of a segment remains fixed at all optimal
allocations, and as the delay of a subset decreases, its payment increases. Recall Definition 2 for “jointly
optimal for”.
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Lemma 1. Given λ, partition agents by equality of λi into sets S1, . . . , Sd such that λ(S1) < · · · < λ(Sd).
1. At any optimal solution X of LP (λ) delay is minimized first for set Sd, then for S(d−1), and so on,
finally for S1. This is equivalent toX being jointly optimal for each Tg, ∀g ∈ [d] where Tg = ∪dq=gSq,,
and for any other optimal solution Y we have delaySg(Y ) = delaySg(X), ∀g ∈ [d].
2. Given two dual optimal solutions (α,p) and (α′,p′), if the first part of dual objective is same at both
for some g ∈ [d], i.e., ∑i∈Sg ,k rikαik = ∑i∈Sg ,k rikα′ik, then for any optimal solution X of LP (λ),
paySg(X,p) = paySg(X,p
′).
3. Given two optimal solutions X and X ′ of LP (λ), and an optimal solution (α,p) of DLP (λ), if for
any subset S ⊆ Sg for g ∈ [d], delayS(X) ≤ delayS(X ′), then payS(X,p) ≥ payS(X ′,p). The
former is strict iff the latter is strict too.
In the above lemma, the first claim follows from extensibility. The second and third claim follow from
the first claim together with the fact that any pair of primal and dual optimal satisfies complementary slack-
ness.
Recall Conditions 3 and 4 of Section 3 requiring respectively budget balanceness, and that when a subset
of agents in a segment are given the “best” allocation, their total payment should be at least their total budget
(or else they will over demand some good). Using the first and last part of Lemma 1 the latter can be roughly
translated to saying that when the rest of the agents are given the “worst” allocation, the rest underpay in
total. Based on this intuition next we define conditions budget balance (BB) and subset condition (SC) in
the following.
Definition 5. Given (λ,p), and a set S ⊆ A, we say that condition
• BB is satisfied: If at any optimal solution X of LP (λ), we have payS(X,p) = m(S).
• SC is satisfied: ∀ T ⊆ S letX to be an optimal solution of LP (λ) where delayT is maximized. Then,
m(T ) ≥ payT (X,p).
We will show that if BB and SC are satisfied for each “segment” at any given λ > 0 then λ is the right
parameter vector. We will call such a (λ,p) proper , formally defined next.
Definition 6. We say that pair (λ,p) is proper if ∃ α such that (α,p) is an optimal solution of DLP (λ),
and pair λ,p satisfies BB and SC for subsets Sg, ∀g ≤ d, where S1, . . . , Sd is the partition of A by equality
of λi.
The next lemma shows that the parameter vector λ corresponding to a proper pair would ensure exis-
tence of allocation where each agent spends exactly her budget, and thereby will give an equilibrium using
Theorem 3.
Lemma 2. If pair (λ∗,p∗) is proper for λ∗ > 0 then there exists an optimal solution X∗ of the primal
LP (λ∗) such that payi(X∗,p∗) = mi, ∀i ∈ A.
Given such a λ∗ and solution (α∗,p∗) of DLP (λ∗) that satisfy conditions of Lemma 2, the above
lemma ensures existence of allocation that satisfies Budget constraint(i), ∀i ∈ A. We derive following
feasibility LP in X variables to compute such an allocation.
Xˆ is a solution of LP (λ∗) :
∑
i λ
∗
i
∑
j dijxij =
∑
i λ
∗
i
∑
j dij xˆij
∀(i, k) : ∑j aijkxij ≥ rik
∀j : ∑i xij ≤ 1
∀i : ∑j p∗jxij = mi
∀(i, j) : xij ≥ 0
(3)
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm to compute market equilibrium under extensibility
1: Input: A, (mi)i∈A, (Delay LP(i))i∈A
2: Initialize A′ ← A, pcur ← 0,λcur ← 0 and k ← 1
3: while A′ 6= ∅ do
4: (Sk,λnew,pnew)← NextSeg(λcur,pcur, A′, (mi)i∈A, (Delay LP(i))i∈A)
5: A′ ← A′ \ Sk, and k ← k + 1
6: λcur ← λnew, and pcur ← pnew.
7: end while
8: Compute allocations xi satisfying Budget constraint(i) for all i ∈ A, by solving LP (3) for p∗ = pcur
and λ∗ = λcur.
9: Output allocations X and prices pcur.
Now our goal has reduced to finding a proper (λ,p) pair. That is, if we think of partition of agents by
equality of λi as “segments”, then we wish to find a vector λ such that BB and SC are satisfied for each
“segment”. Our algorithm, defined in Algorithm 3, tries to fulfill exactly this goal. At a high level, like in
Section 3, our algorithm will build the segments bottom up, i.e., lowest to highest λ segments. We will start
by setting all the λs to same value, and find lowest λ value where BB and SC are satisfied for a subset. Once
found we freeze this subset as a segment and start increasing λ for the rest to find the next segment, and
repeat.
In this process of finding the next segment we need to make sure that BB and SC conditions are main-
tained for the previous segments. In Section 3 we were able to do this by simply fixing the prices of the
goods in earlier segments, because goods were not shared across segments. Here, some of the goods allo-
cated to agents in the earlier segments may also be allocated to agents in the later segments, and additionally
these allocations are not fixed and may keep changing during the algorithm. (We fix the allocation only at
the end.) Furthermore, the prices are required to be dual optimal w.r.t. the λ vector that we eventually find.
On the other hand in order to maintain BB and SC conditions for the previous segments we need to ensure
that the total payment of previous segments do not change.
The next lemma shows that this is indeed possible by proving that prices of goods bought by agents
from previous segments can be held fixed. In fact, we will be able to fix αiks as well, for agents in the
previous segments. The proof involves an application of Farkas’ lemma, leveraging extensibility. During
computation of next segment, we will hold fix the λs of agents in segments found so far, and increase the
λs of the remaining agents. To facilitate this we define 1S ∈ {0, 1}A as the indicator vector of S ⊆ A, i.e.,
1S(i) = 1 if i ∈ S, and is 0 otherwise.
Lemma 3. Given a λ, partition agents into S1, . . . , Sd by equality of λi, where λ(S1) < · · · < λ(Sd). For
R ⊆ Sd consider primal optimal Xˆ that is jointly optimal for R, and let (αˆ, pˆ) be a dual optimal. Consider
for some a > 0, the vector λ′ = λ+a1R. Then Xˆ is optimal in LP (λ′) and there exists an optimal solution
(α′,p′) of DLP (λ′) such that,
∀j : p′j ≥ pˆj and
∑
i/∈R xˆij > 0⇒ p′j = pˆj
∀i /∈ R, ∀k, α′ik = αˆik .
As discussed above our algorithm will build segments inductively from the lowest to highest λ value,
by increasing λ of only the “remaining” agents. Suppose, we have built segments S1 through Sk−1, and
let A′ = A \ ∪k−1g=1Sg be the remaining agents. Let λcur be the current λ vector where λcur(S1) < · · · <
λcur(Sk−1) < λcur(A′). Let pcur be the corresponding dual price vector which is optimal for DLP (λcur).
For ease of notations we define the following.
For any a ≥ 0, define λa = λcur + a1A′ . (4)
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Algorithm 4 Subroutine NextSeg(λcur,pcur, A′, (mi)i∈A, (Delay LP(i))i∈A)
1: Initialize a0 ← 0, a1 ← ∆, where ∆ = (∑i,j,k |aijk|+∑i,k |rik|+∑i,j |dij |+∑i |mi|)2mn|C|.
2: Define function fa as in (7).
3: Set S0 ∈ arg minS⊆A′,S 6=∅ fa0(S) and S1 ∈ arg minS⊆A′,S 6=∅ fa1(S)
4: while S0 6= S1 do
5: Set a∗ ← a0+a12 and S∗ ∈ arg minS⊆A′,S 6=∅ fa∗(S)
6: if fa∗(S∗) > 0 then Set a0 ← a∗ and S0 ← S∗
7: else Set a1 ← a∗ and S1 ← S∗
8: end if
9: end while
10: S∗ ← S0. Compute a∗ by solving feasibility LP for S∗ mentioned in Lemma 6 such that fa∗(S∗) = 0
11: // Next we compute maximal minimizer of function fa∗ containing set S∗.
12: A′ ← A′ \ S∗.
13: while A′ 6= ∅ do
14: S ← arg minS⊆A′,T 6=∅ fa∗(S ∪ S∗)
15: if fa∗(S ∪ S∗) > 0 then break
16: else set S∗ ← S∗ ∪ S, A′ ← A′ \ S
17: end while
18: Set λnew ← λa∗ , λnewi ← λnewi + 1A′ , and pnew ←valid price at λnew, where ← 1∆
19: Return (S∗,λnew,pnew)
Fix an allocation Xcur of LP (λcur). We call an optimal solution (α,p) of DLP (λa) valid if prices are
monotone w.r.t. pcur and Xcur, in the sense as guaranteed by Lemma 3 (where prices of goods allocated
to previous segments are held fixed and prices of the rest of the goods are not decreased), and αis are fixed
for agents outside A′. We will call the corresponding prices valid prices. For simplicity we will assume
uniqueness of valid prices.6
Define pa to be the valid price vector at dual optimal of DLP (λa) (5)
Since the correctness is proved by induction, the inductive hypothesis is that w.r.t. (λcur,pcur), both SC
and BB are satisfied for S1, . . . Sk−1, and SC is satisfied for the remaining agents A′. The base case is easy
with the λis all set to 0. Our next goal is to find the next segment Sk ⊆ A′, a new vector λnew and a new
price vector pnew such that the following properties hold.
1. Parameter vector λnew is obtained from λcur by fixing λis of agents outsideA′, increase λis of agents
in Sk by the same amount, and those of agentsA′ \Sk by some more. The latter increase is to separate
Sk from A′. That is for some a ≥ 0 and  > 0,λnew = λa + 1A′\Sk .
2. Price vector pnew is valid and optimal for DLP (λnew).
3. W.r.t. (λnew,pnew), S1, . . . , Sk satisfy both BB and SC, and A′ \ Sk satisfies SC.
The computation of the next segment Sk satisfying the above conditions is done by the subroutine
NextSeg, which we describe next, and which is formally defined in Algorithm 4. As in Section 3, the basic
idea is to reduce this problem to a single parameter binary search. Since Condition SC is satisfied for the
6This is without loss of generality since perturbing the parameters of the market ensures this. A typical way to simulate
perturbation is by lexicographic ordering [50].
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remaining agents A′ at (λcur,pcur) while BB is not, total payment of A′ is less than their total budget
m(A′). In order to keep track of this surplus budget, consider the following function on S ⊆ A′.
fλ,p(S) = m(S)− payS(X,p), where X is an optimal solution to LP (λ) that maximizes delayS . (6)
We translate Condition 3 above in terms of this function, in the following lemma, which essentially
reduces the problem to a single parameter search.
Lemma 4. Suppose that for some a ≥ 0,
Sk ∈ arg minS⊆A′,S 6=∅{fλa,pa(S)}.
Further, suppose that fλa,pa(Sk) = 0, and Sk be a maximal such set. Then there exists a rational number
 > 0 of polynomial-size such that, w.r.t. (λnew,pnew) as defined above, S1, . . . , Sk satisfy both BB and
SC, and A′ \ Sk satisfy SC.
The above lemma reduces the task of finding next segment to finding an appropriate a such that the
minimum value of fλa,pa is zero under the valid price p
a. This requires two things: first we need to
find a minimizer of fλa,pa for a given a > 0, and second we need to find the right value of a. The next
lemma shows that the first can be done using an algorithm for submodular minimization, and therefore in a
polynomial time [51]. For convenience of notation, we define the following functions.
fa(S) := fλa,pa(S) and g(a) := min
S⊆A′,S 6=∅
fa(S) (7)
Lemma 5. Given a ≥ 0, function fa is submodular over set A′.
Now the question remains, how does one find an a such that the minimum value is 0, i.e., g(a) = 0. We
will do binary search for the same. In the next lemma we derive a number of properties of g that facilitates
binary search, under sufficient demand assumption (Definition 4), while crucially using Lemmas 1 and 3.
Lemma 6. Function g satisfies the following: (i) g(0) ≥ 0. (ii) fa(S) is continuous and monotonically
decreasing in a, ∀S ⊆ A′, therefore g is continuous and monotonically decreasing. (iii) ∃ah ≥ 0 a rational
number of polynomial size such that g(ah) ≤ 0, and g has a zero of polynomial-size. (iv) Given a set
S ⊆ A′, if fa(S) > 0 and fa′(S) < 0 for a′ > a > 0, then ∃a∗ ≥ 0 such that fa∗(S) = 0 and such an a∗
can be computed by solving a feasibility linear program of polynomial-size.
The first part follows essentially from the fact that A′ satisfies SC condition w.r.t. (λcur,pcur) equiv-
alently (λ0,p0). For the second part, we show that for any S ⊆ A′, function fa(S) is monotonically
decreasing and continuous in a. Since min of continuous and decreasing functions is also continuous and
decreasing, we get the same property for g. It turns out that whatever be the current value of g(a), there
is another a′ > a where g(a′) is strictly smaller (using sufficient demand assumption). This strict de-
crease property ensures existence of a where g(a) is zero. Setting ah to higher than any such a would give
g(ah) ≤ 0 since fa(S) for all S are monotonically decreasing in a, thereby we get the third part. Finally for
the fourth part, existence of a∗ follows from monotonicity and continuity of fa(S) in a, and using the fact
that complementary slackness ensures optimality we construct a feasibility linear program to compute a∗,
given S ⊆ A′, such that fa∗(S) = 0.
We initialize our binary search with a lower pivot a0 = 0 and a higher pivot a1 to a value that is
guaranteed to be higher than where some set goes tight (third part of Lemma 6). Finally, since submodular
minimization, binary search over a polynomial-sized range, and solving linear program all can be done in
polynomial-time, we get our main result, Theorem 2, using Lemmas 2, 4 and 6, and Theorem 3.
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5 Examples
In this section we show several interesting examples that illustrate important properties of our market and of
equilibria. In addition we demonstrate a run of our algorithm on a routing example.
Non-existence of equilibria. Consider the networks (typically used to show Braess’ paradox) in Figure
3, where the label on each edge specifies its (capacity, delay cost). There are two agents, each with a
requirement of 1 from s to t. Their mis are 100 and 1 respectively. The network on the left has enough
capacity to route two units of flow, but does not satisfy strong feasibility condition and does not have an
equilibrium. This demonstrates importance of strong feasibility condition, without which even a simple
market may not have an equilibrium.
The network in the middle does satisfy strong feasibility but not extensibility and has an equilibrium.
The network on the right satisfies extensibility but not strong feasibility and has an equilibrium. This demon-
strates that conditions of strong feasibility and extensibility are incomparable.
𝑡𝑡
𝑣𝑣
𝑢𝑢
𝑠𝑠
(1, 1)
(1, 2)
(1, 1)
(1, 2)
(1, 3)𝑡𝑡
𝑣𝑣
𝑢𝑢
𝑠𝑠
(1, 1)
(1, 100)
(1, 100)
(1, 1)
(1, 1) 𝑡𝑡
𝑣𝑣
𝑢𝑢
𝑠𝑠
(1, 1)
(1, 100)
(1, 100)
(1, 1)(1, 1)
(1, 500)
Figure 3: Non-existence of equilibria: The network on the left does not satisfy strong feasibility and has no equilibria.
Edge labels specify (capacity, delay cost), there are two agents, each with a requirement of 1 from s to t. The mis are
100, 1. The same network with an additional edge with huge cost in the middle, does satisfy strong feasibility but not
extensibility and has an equilibrium. The network on the right with different edge labels satisfies the extensibility but
not strong feasibility. It has an equilibrium and our algorithm will find one.
Non-convexity of equilibria. Consider a market in the scheduling setting of Section 3, with 6 agents, each
with a requirement of 1. Their mis are 30, 17, 9, 4, 3, 1. Table 1 depicts some of the equilibrium prices for
this instance. A bigger example with 9 agents is in Table 2. These examples show that the equilibrium set
is not convex, but forms a connected set. Since these are in high dimension, it is not easy to determine the
exact shape of the entire equilibrium set, but one can see that it is quite complicated.
A run of the algorithm. We describe the run of our algorithms on simple examples here. The run of
Algorithm 1 on the example in Table 1 is as follows. Each row below depicts one iteration, where we find
a new segment. We first give the set of agents in this new segment, then the corresponding λ, and then the
prices of the slots determined in this iteration. The last column shows the sets which give the second and
third lowest λs in that iteration, and hence were not selected.
S1 = {6}, λS1 = 1, p6 = 1 (λ{5,6} = 11/3, λ{4,5,6} = 11/3, . . . )
S2 = {4, 5}, λS2 = 12/3, p5 = 22/3, p4 = 41/3 (λ{5} = 2, λ{3,4,5} = 21/6, . . . )
S3 = {3}, λS3 = 42/3, p3 = 9 (λ{2,3} = 57/9, λ{1,2,3} = 71/6)
S4 = {2}, λS4 = 8, p2 = 17 (λ{1,2} = 92/3)
S5 = {1}, λS5 = 13, p1 = 30
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Table 1: An example in the scheduling setting of Section 3 where the set of equilibrium prices is non-convex. There
are 6 agents, each with a requirement of 1. Their mis are 30, 17, 9, 4, 3 and 1. We depict only a subset of all equilibria
here. In particular, we depict 6 equilibrium prices, p1,p2, · · · ,p6. All prices either along solid lines connecting any
two of these points, or in the shaded region are equilibria. However, if any two of these prices are not connected by a
solid line, then none of the points on the line joining them is an equilibrium. For example, none of the prices on the
line joining p1 and p6, p2 and p5, or p3 and p4 is an equilibrium. There are more equilibrium points not depicted
here. As far as we can tell, the shape of the equilibrium set is something akin to a cup, with empty space inside, but
forming a single connected region.
𝒑𝒑1
𝒑𝒑𝟑𝟑 𝒑𝒑𝟓𝟓
𝒑𝒑𝟔𝟔
𝒑𝒑𝟐𝟐 𝒑𝒑𝟒𝟒
p1 : (30, 17, 9, 5, 2, 1)
p2 : (30, 17, 9, 41/3, 22/3, 1)
p3 : (34, 13, 9, 5, 2, 1)
p4 : (34, 13, 9, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
p5 : (35, 13, 8, 41/3, 22/3, 1)
p6 : (35, 13, 8, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
The equilibrium price found in this run is the point p2 in Table 1. This price curve is shown in Figure
4. The allocation obtained by solving the feasibility LP (3) is as follows: x11 = 1, x22 = 1, x33 = 1, x44 =
4/5, x45 = 1/5, x54 = 1/5, x55 = 4/5, x66 = 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
S4
S5
S1
S3
S2
Figure 4: Piecewise linear convex decreasing curve of equilibrium prices obtained by the algorithm for the example
in Table 1.
We next describe the run of the algorithm on a network flow example, described in Figure 5. The figure
shows the network structure and the edge labels specify (capacity, delay cost). There are five agents with
requirements 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 from s to t respectively. Their mis are 12, 10, 4, 2, 2. This network is not
series-parallel, yet it satisfies the extensibility condition, so our algorithm finds an equilibrium.
The run of Algorithm 3 on this example (in Figure 5) is as follows. Once again, each row below depicts
one iteration, where we find a new segment. We first give the set of agents in the new segment, then the
corresponding λ, and then the prices of the edges that are fixed in this iteration. The last column shows the
second and third lowest λs in that iteration.
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Table 2: An example in the scheduling setting of Section 3 where the set of equilibrium prices is non-convex. There
are 9 agents, each with a requirement of 1. Their mis are 56, 45, 33, 23, 17, 10, 4, 3 and 1. We depict only a subset of
all equilibria here. In particular, we depict 20 equilibrium prices, p1,p2, · · · ,p20. All prices either along solid lines
connecting any two of these points, or in the shaded region are equilibria. However, if any two of these prices are not
connected by a solid line, then none of the points on the line joining them is an equilibrium.
࢖૜ ࢖૝
࢖૛
࢖ૠ
࢖૞
࢖૟
࢖૚૚ ࢖૚૛
࢖૛૙
࢖ૢ࢖ૡ
࢖૚૝
࢖૚ૡ
࢖૚ૢ
࢖૚૞
࢖૚ૠ
࢖૚૟
࢖૚૜࢖૚૙
࢖૚
p1 : (57, 44, 33, 24, 16, 10, 5, 2, 1)
p2 : (57, 442/3, 321/3, 24, 16, 10, 5, 2, 1)
p3 : (57, 44, 33, 24, 162/3, 91/3, 5, 2, 1)
p4 : (57, 44, 33, 24, 16, 10, 5, 22/3, 1/3)
p5 : (571/3, 442/3, 32, 24, 16, 10, 5, 2, 1)
p6 : (57, 44, 33, 241/3, 162/3, 9, 5, 2, 1)
p7 : (57, 44, 33, 24, 16, 10, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
p8 : (571/3, 442/3, 32, 24, 162/3, 91/3, 5, 2, 1)
p9 : (571/3, 442/3, 32, 24, 16, 10, 5, 22/3, 1/3)
p10 : (57, 442/3, 321/3, 241/3, 162/3, 9, 5, 2, 1)
p11 : (57, 44, 33, 241/3, 162/3, 9, 5, 22/3, 1/3)
p12 : (57, 44, 33, 24, 162/3, 91/3, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
p13 : (57, 442/3, 321/3, 24, 16, 10, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
p14 : (571/3, 442/3, 32, 241/3, 162/3, 9, 5, 2, 1)
p15 : (571/3, 442/3, 32, 24, 16, 10, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
p16 : (57, 44, 33, 241/3, 162/3, 9, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
p17 : (57, 442/3, 321/3, 241/3, 162/3, 9, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
p18 : (571/3, 442/3, 32, 241/3, 162/3, 9, 5, 22/3, 1/3)
p19 : (571/3, 442/3, 32, 24, 162/3, 91/3, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
p20 : (571/3, 442/3, 32, 241/3, 162/3, 9, 51/3, 22/3, 0)
࢙ ࢚
࢜
࢝ ࢛
ሺ11, 2ሻ
ሺ20, 0ሻ
ሺ30, 0ሻ
ሺ11, 0ሻ
ሺ10, 3ሻ
࢞
Figure 5: A network flow example where there are 5 agents with requirements 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 from s to t re-
spectively. Their mi’s are 12, 10, 4, 2, 2. The network satisfies the extensibility condition, so our algorithm finds an
equilibrium.
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S1 = {3, 4, 5}, λS1 = 8/37, psx = pxt = pwt = 0, pst = 8/37, psw = 16/37 (λ{4,5} = 4/13,
λ{2,3,4,5} = 9/35)
S2 = {1, 2}, λS2 = 478/1147, pwu = 478/1147, pvt = 478/1147, psv = puv = put = 0 (λ{2} = 194/407)
The allocation from the feasibility LP (3):
• Agent 1 sends 2012/239 units of flow on path s − w − u − v − t and 378/239 units of flow on path
s− w − u− t.
• Agent 2 sends 2251/239 units of flow on path s− w − u− t and 378/239 units of flow on path s− w −
u− v − t.
• Agent 3 sends 8 units of flow on path s − w − t, 5/2 units of flow on path s − t and 3/2 units of flow
on path s− x− t.
• Agent 4 sends 2 units of flow on path s−w− t, 21/4 units of flow on path s− t and 23/4 units of flow
on path s− x− t.
• Agent 5 sends 2 units of flow on path s−w− t, 21/4 units of flow on path s− t and 27/4 units of flow
on path s− x− t.
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A Related work on computation and applications of market equilibrium
Computation and Complexity: The computational complexity of market equilibrium has been exten-
sively studied for the tradition models in the past decade and a half. This investigation has involved many
algorithmic techniques, such as primal-dual and flow based methods [18, 19, 46, 56, 57], auction algorithms
[28], ellipsoid [32] and other convex programming based techniques [13], cell-decomposition [16, 17, 55],
distributed price update rules [11, 14, 58], and complementary pivoting algorithms [25, 26], to name some of
the most prominent. The algorithms have been complemented by hardness results, either for PPAD [10, 12]
or for FIXP [22, 27], pretty much closing the gap between the two. Most of these papers focus on traditional
utility functions used in the economics literature. A notable exception that considers combinatorial utility
functions is [33], that study a market where agents want to send flow in a network, motivated by rate control
algorithms governing the traffic in the Internet.
Beyond being an important component in the complexity theory of total functions [39], the computation
of market equilibria has been studied by economists for much longer [6, 49, 54]. The classic case for the
use of equilibrium computation is counter-factual evaluation of policy or design changes [52], based on the
assumption that markets left to themselves operate at an equilibrium.
Fair allocation: Recently, market equilibrium outcomes have been used for fair allocation. Market equi-
librium conditions are often considered inherently fair, therefore equilibrium outcomes have been used to
allocate resources by a central planner seeking a fair allocation even when there is no actual market or mon-
etary transfers. E.g., the proportional fair allocation, which is well known to be equivalent to the equilibrium
allocation in a Fisher market [35], is widely used in the design of computer networks. Exchange of band-
width in a bittorrent network is modeled as a process that converges to a market equilibrium by Wu and
Zhang [58]. Budish [7] proposes “competitive outcome from equal incomes” (CEEI) as a way to allocate
courses to students: the allocation is an equilibrium in a market for courses in which the students participate
with equal budgets (with random perturbations to break ties). This scheme has been successfully used at
the Wharton business school [8]. Cole et al. [15] show that a suitable modification of the Fisher market
equilibrium allocation can be used as a solution to a problem of fair resource allocation, without money. The
mechanism is truthful, and satisfies an approximate per-agent welfare guarantee. Truthful mechanisms have
also been designed for scheduling, where it is the auctioneer who has jobs to be scheduled and the agents
are the one providing the required resources e.g., see [37, 44]. This is in contrast to our setting where the
agents have scheduling requirements.
Market based mechanisms: There is also a long history of “market based mechanisms”, where a mech-
anism (with monetary transfers) implements an equilibrium outcome. The New York Stock Exchange uses
such a mechanism to determine the opening prices, and copper and gold prices in London are fixed using
a similar procedure [48]. There are different ways to do this: use a sample (either historic or random) or a
probabilistic model of the population to compute the equilibrium price, and offer these prices to new agents.
This is preferable to asking the bidders to report their preferences, computing the equilibrium on reported
preferences and offering the equilibrium prices back. The latter leads to obvious strategic issues; Hurwicz
[31] shows that strategic behavior by agents participating in such a mechanism can lead to inefficiencies.
Babaioff et al. [1] show price of anarchy bounds on such mechanisms. In any case, such mechanisms are
“incentive compatible in the large”, meaning that as the market size grows and each agent becomes insignif-
icant enough to affect prices on his own, his best strategy is to accept the equilibrium outcome. Nonetheless
such mechanisms have been proposed and used in practice, e.g., for selling TV ads [45].
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Figure 6: On the left is an example of Myerson’s ironing. The solid curve with the blue dots is the given curve, which
is non-monotone. The dashed curve with the orange dots is the ironed curve, which is monotone. On the right is an
example of our problem. The solid curve is the money function, which is monotone but not convex. The dashed one is
the price function, which is convex. Both dashed curves are such that their “area under the curve” is higher than that
for the solid curves, and satisfy a minimality condition among all such curves.
Budget constraints: Budget constraints in auctions has gained popularity in the last decade due to ad
auctions [4, 21, 24, 40], but has been studied for quite some time [9, 36]. There has also been a recent line
of work considering budget constraints in a procurement setting [2, 53].
B Relation to Myerson’s ironing
For a special case of the scheduling setting, when ri = 1, ∀ i ∈ A, we show that equilibrium conditions are
equivalent to a set of conditions that are reminiscent of the ironing procedure used in the characterization
of optimal auctions by Myerson [43]. It is in fact “one higher derivative” analog of Myerson’s ironing.
Let’s first restate Myerson’s ironing procedure for the case of a uniform distribution over a discrete support.
Suppose that we plot on the x-axis the quantiles, in the decreasing order of value, and on the y-axis the
corresponding virtual values. This is possibly a non-monotone function, and Myerson’s ironing asks for an
ironed function that is monotone non-increasing, and is such that the area under the curve (starting at 0) of
the ironed function is always higher than that for the given function. Further, the ironed function given by
this procedure is the minimal among all such functions. This means that wherever the area under the curve
differs for the two functions, the ironed function is constant. (See Figure 6 on page 22.)
In the special case of our model with a single good and when requirements are all one, the equilibrium
price of the good as a function of time is obtained as an ironed analog of the money function: the function
i 7→ mi, where we assume the mis are sorted in the decreasing order. This money function is monotone
non-increasing by definition but it need not be a convex function. The price as a function of time must be a
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monotone non-increasing and convex function. The area under the curve of the price function must always
be higher than that of the money function; further, wherever the two areas are different, the price function
must be linear. One can see that the conditions are the same as that of Myerson’s ironing, except each
condition is replaced by a higher derivative analog. Unlike Myerson’s, the solution to our problem is no
longer unique and the solution set may be non-convex!
C Existence of Equilibrium under Strong Feasibility
In this section we show existence of equilibrium for market instances satisfying strong feasibility (Definition
1 in Section 2). Given such an instanceMwith setA of n agents and setG ofm goods, let us create another
instanceM′ by adding an extra good swith “large quantity” and very high delay cost. Recall that the number
of goods and agents in marketM be m and n respectively.
Set of agents and goods in marketM′ are respectively A and G′ = G ∪ {s}. After normalizing to get
quantity 1 for good s, we set coefficient of variable xis in all the constraints of CC(i) to as = (n+ 1)rmax
for each agent, and set the delay cost for good s and for every agent to ds = m(m+1)dmaxas
(
amax
amin
)m
,
where amax = maxi,j,k |aijk|, amin = min{1,mini,j,k |aijk|}, and rmax = maxi,k rik. Thus, given prices
(p1, . . . , pm, ps) of goods inM′, the optimal bundle of agent i at these prices can be found by solving the
following linear program.
OPTi(p) = arg min :
∑
j dijxij + dsxis
s.t.
∑
j aijkxij + asxis ≥ rik, ∀k ∈ C∑
j pjxij + psxis ≤ mi
xij ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ G′
(8)
The next lemma follows from the construction of marketM′.
Lemma 7. IfM satisfies strong feasibility then so doesM′.
Price vector p is said to be at equilibrium, if when every agent is given its optimal bundle, there is no
excess demand of any good, and goods with excess supply have price zero. That is, (X,p) such that,
∀i ∈ A, xi ∈ OPTi(p), and ∀j ∈ G′,
∑
i∈A
xij ≤ 1; pj > 0⇒
∑
i∈A
xij = 1 (9)
Lemma 8. If xi ∈ OPTi(p), ∀i ∈ A at prices p ≥ 0 for M′, then
∑
i xis < 1. That is ps = 0 at
equilibrium.
Proof. It is easy to see that xis ≤ 1n+1 , ∀i, and hence the proof follows.
Next we show that equilibria ofM andM′ are related.
Lemma 9. IfM satisfies strong feasibility, then every equilibrium ofM′ gives an equilibrium ofM.
Proof. Let (X∗,p∗) respectively be an equilibrium allocation and prices ofM′. From Lemma 8, we know
that p∗s = 0. It suffices to show that x∗is = 0, ∀i ∈ A, for the lemma to follow.
To the contrary suppose for some agent u, x∗us > 0. We will construct another bundle x′u that is
affordable to agent u at prices p∗, satisfies CC(u), and has a lower delay than x∗u, contradicting optimal
bundle condition at equilibrium.
Due to strong feasibility, after all i 6= u is given their bundle x∗i , there will be a bundle x′u left for u to
buy among goods in G such that CC(u) constraints are satisfied. Clearly, one way to construct such x′u is
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that the agent keeps buying all goods j 6= s as in x∗u, and starts decreasing x∗us and increasing allocation for
some other available good. Note that all such available goods are under-sold at equilibrium and therefore
has zero price in p∗. Thus payment for x′u and x∗u are the same at prices p∗. In other words x′u is affordable
at prices p∗.
If good j is increased by δj as we go from x∗u to x′u, then we claim that δj ≤ m!as
(
amax
amin
)m
x∗us, where
m = |G|. This is because, in a constraint even if coefficient of variable xuj is minimum possible, and it
needs to compensate for increase in other goods due to their negative coefficients, this cascade could at most
harm by a factor of m!
(
amax
amin
)m
. Difference in delay is∑
j duj(x
′
uj − x∗uj)− dsx∗us =
∑
j dujδj − dsx∗us
≤ mdmax(maxj δj)− dsx∗us
≤
(
m(m+1)dmaxas
(
amax
amin
)m − ds)x∗us < 0
Due to Lemma 9, to show existence of equilibrium for marketM it suffices to show one forM′. Next
to show existence of equilibrium for marketM′ it suffices to consider price vectors where ps = 0 due to
Lemma 8, and therefore we consider the following set of possible price vectors.
P = {p ∈ R(m+1)+ | ps = 0;
∑
j∈G
pj ≤M} where M =
∑
imi
Let us first handle trivial instances. It is easy to see that the feasible set of xis in LP (8) at p = 0 is a
superset of the feasible set at any other prices p. Therefore, for agent i if xi = 0 ∈ OPTi(0), then she will
not buy anything at any prices. In that case, it is safe to discard her from the market. Further, if there is an
allocation X satisfying Supply constraints for marketM′ such that xi ∈ OPTi(0), ∀i ∈ A, then we get a
trivial equilibrium ofM′ where all the prices are set to zero; note that in this case zero prices also constitute
an equilibrium of marketM by Lemma 9. To show existence for non-trivial instances, w.l.o.g. now on we
assume the following for marketM′.
Weak Sufficient Demand (WSD): If X is such that ∀i ∈ A, xi ∈ OPTi(0), then xi 6= 0, ∀i, and there
exists a good j ∈ G′ such that∑i xij > 1. Clearly, j 6= s due to Lemma 8.
Lemma 10. For any p ∈ P , OPTi(p) is non-empty, and assuming WSD, 0 /∈ OPTi(p), ∀i ∈ A.
Proof. The first part of the proof is easy to see due to the extra good s whose price is zero in P . For the
second part, to the contrary suppose for xi ∈ OPTi(p) we have xi = 0. By WSD assumption we know
that for any x0i /∈ OPTi(0), we have x0i 6= 0. Further, feasible set of LP (8) is at prices p is a subset of the
feasible set of this LP at zero prices. Hence we know that
∑
j dijx
0
ij <
∑
j dijxij = 0.
It must be the case that x0i is not affordable at prices p, i.e., mi <
∑
j x
0
ijpj . For λ = mi/
∑
j x
0
ijpj ,
set x′i = λx
0
i + (1 − λ)xi. Since xi and x0i both satisfy CC(i), so does x′i. And since xi = 0 bundle x′i
is affordable at prices p, thereby x′i is feasible in OPTi(p). The delay at x
′
i is
∑
i dijx
′
ij =
∑
j dij(λx
0
ij +
(1− λ)xij) = λ
∑
j dijx
0
ij < 0 =
∑
j dijxij , a contradiction to xi being optimal bundle at prices p.
Next we will construct a correspondence whose fixed points are exactly the market equilibria of M′.
Let cmaxj be the maximum possible demand of good j; we can compute c
max
j by maximizing
∑
i xij over
the CC(i) constraints of all agents i ∈ A. Define domain
D = {(X,p) | p ∈ P ; X ≥ 0; ∀j,
∑
i
xij ≤ cmaxj }
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Let δ = minimi. Define correspondence F : D → D as follows where for a given (X¯, p¯) ∈ D, we have
(X ′,p′) ∈ F (X¯, p¯),
∀i ∈ A, x′i ∈ OPTi(p¯), and p′ ∈ arg max
p∈P, δ≤∑j pj≤max{δ,∑i∈A,j∈G′ x¯ij p¯j}
∑
i∈A,j∈G′
x¯ijpj (10)
The correspondence is well defined due to Lemma 10. If F (X¯, p¯) is a convex set, and graph of F
is closed, then Kakutani’s Theorem [34] implies that F has a fixed point, i.e., ∃(X∗,p∗) ∈ D such that
(X∗,p∗) ∈ F (X∗,p∗). Next we show the same.
Lemma 11. Correspondence F has a fixed point.
Proof. Clearly, F (X¯, p¯) is a convex set since it is a cross product of solution sets of LPs. The lemma
follows using Kakutani’s fixed-point Theorem [34] if graph of F is closed.
Let (X¯t, p¯t) for t = 1, 2, . . . be a sequence of points inD, and let (Xt,pt) be another sequence such that
(Xt,pt) ∈ F (X¯t, p¯t). Then essentially, Xt and pt are solutions of LPs that are continuously changing with
(X¯, p¯). Therefore, if limt→∞(X¯
t
, p¯t) = (X¯
∗
, p¯∗) and limt→∞(Xt,pt) = (X∗,p∗), then by continuity of
parameterized LP solutions, we get that (X∗,p∗) ∈ F (X¯∗, p¯∗), implying graph of F is closed.
Lemma 12. If (X∗,p∗) is a fixed-point of F then ∀j ∈ G′,∑i∈A x∗ij ≤ 1.
Proof. Since x∗i ∈ OPTi(p∗), ∀i ∈ A,
∑
i∈A x
∗
is ≤ 1 follows using Lemma 8. Among the rest of the
goods, suppose, for j′ 6= s we have ∑i∈A x∗ij′ > 1. Let U = max{δ,∑i,j x∗ijp∗j}. Then the optimization
problem of (10) is
max
p∈P, δ≤∑j pj≤U
∑
i,j
x∗ijpj = maxp∈P, δ≤∑j pj≤U
∑
j
pj
∑
i
x∗ij
The above quantity can be made more than U by setting pj′ = U , and therefore optimal value is strictly more
than U . However, due to the fixed-point condition p∗ is a solution of the above, which implies
∑
i,j x
∗
ijp
∗
j >
U , a contradiction.
Lemma 13. Assuming weak sufficient demand (WSD), if (X∗,p∗) is a fixed-point of F then p∗ 6= 0 and∑
i,j x
∗
ijp
∗
j ≥ δ.
Proof. For the first part, to the contrary suppose p∗ = 0. Then ∀i ∈ A,x∗i ∈ OPTi(0) since (X∗,p∗), and
therefore by WSD condition ∃j 6= s, x∗ij > 1. However
∑
i,j x
∗
ijp
∗
j = 0. Therefore,
max
p∈P, δ≤∑j pj≤max{δ,∑i,j x∗ijp∗j}
∑
i,j
x∗ijpj = maxp∈P, ∑j pj=δ
∑
i,j
x∗ijpj > 0
This contradicts the fact that p∗ is a maximizer of the above.
For the second part, to the contrary suppose
∑
i,j x
∗
ijp
∗
j < δ, then max{δ,
∑
i,j x
∗
ijp
∗
j} = δ. Further, due
to Lemma 10 (together with the WSD assumption) we have ∀i ∈ A,x∗i 6= 0, and therefore at maximum∑
j pj = δ. Since p
∗ is a maximizer of the above,
∑
j p
∗
j = δ.
However since
∑
i,j x
∗
ijp
∗
j < δ, we get ∀i,
∑
j x
∗
ijp
∗
j < mi where x
∗
i is feasible in LP (8) at prices p
∗.
Let X0 be a demand vector when all the prices are zero. Due to Lemma 12 and WSD assumption we get
that for some agent i, x∗i /∈ OPTi(0). Let i′ be this agent. This implies
∑
j di′jx
0
i′j <
∑
j di′jx
∗
i′j . Despite
lower cost at x0i′ she demands x
∗
i′ at prices p
∗, hence it should be the case that she can not afford x0i′ at those
prices. However, since i′ is also not spending all the money at prices p∗, there exists some 0 < τ < 1 such
that she can affordX ′i′ = τx
∗
i′+(1−τ)x0i′ at p∗. Since both x0i′ and x∗i′ satisfy the CC(i′) constraints of LP
(8) for agent i′, so does X ′i′ . Thus, X
′
i′ is a feasible point in OPTi′(p
∗) LP, and
∑
j di′jx
′
i′j <
∑
j di′jx
∗
i′j ,
a contradiction to x∗i′ ∈ OPTi′(p∗).
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Next we show the main result using Lemmas 11, 12 and 13.
Theorem 4. IfM′ satisfies strong feasibility then it has an equilibrium.
Proof. Due to Lemma 11, we know that there exists a fixed-point of correspondence F . Let this be (X∗,p∗).
We will show that it is a market equilibrium ofM′. Clearly, optimal allocation condition is satisfied because
x∗i ∈ OPTi(p∗). Market clearing remains to be shown, which requires: (a) ∀j,
∑
i x
∗
ij ≤ 1, and (b)
p∗j > 0⇒
∑
i x
∗
ij = 1.
(a) follows from Lemma 12. For (b), let U = max{δ,∑i,j x∗ijp∗j}, then due to Lemma 13, U =∑
i,j x
∗
ijp
∗
j . The optimization problem of (10) is
max
p∈P, δ≤∑j pj≤U
∑
i,j
x∗ijpj = maxp∈P, δ≤∑j pj≤U
∑
j
pj
∑
i
x∗ij
Clearly, at optimal solution of the above pj is non-zero only where
∑
i x
∗
ij is maximum. Since p
∗ is a
solution, if ∃j, ∑i x∗ij = 1, then (b) follows.
On the other hand suppose for all j we have
∑
i x
∗
ij < 1, then clearly the optimal value of the above
is strictly less than U . However since p∗ is a maximizer it implies that
∑
i,j x
∗
ijp
∗
j < U , a contradiction to
Lemma 13.
The next theorem follows using Lemmas 7, 9, and Theorem 4.
Theorem 1. [Strong feasibility implies existence of an equilibrium] If (CC(i))i∈A of marketM satisfies
strong feasibility, then ∃ an allocation X and prices p that constitute a market equilibrium ofM.
Remark 1. By similar argument, we can show existence of equilibrium for market instances satisfying only
extensibility, and sufficient demand conditions (see Definitions 3 and 4). However, since our algorithm
returns an equilibrium of such a market, it already gives a constructive proof of existence.
C.1 Quasi-concave utility functions
In this section, we show that the preferences of agents in our model can be captured by quasi-concave utility
functions. Notation: the symbol ≤ when used for vectors represents a co-ordinate wise relation, and <
represents that at least one of the inequalities is strict. Define the utility of an agent i for an allocation xi to
be the smallest delay of a feasible allocation dominated by xi, times −1:
Ui(xi) = −min {di · x′i : x′i ≤ xi & x′i is feasible for Delay LP(i)} .
If there is no x′i ≤ xi that is feasible for Delay LP(i) then the utility is −∞. It is easy to check that this
utility function is quasi-concave, and induces the same preferences as in our model.
D Special Cases
In this section, we show how several natural problems satisfy the extensibility condition (Definition 3) in
Section 2.
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Scheduling. Recall the scheduling problem from Section 2.3. The agents are jobs that require d different
types of machines, and the set of machines of type k is Mk; the machines are the goods in the market.
Each agent needs rik ∈ R+ units of machines in all of type k, which is captured by the covering constraint∑
j∈Mk xijk ≥ rik, ∀k ∈ [d]. All agents experience the same delay djk from machine j in type k.
Lemma 14. Scheduling problem satisfies the extensibility condition.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary set of agents S and an agent iˆ outside of this set. Let (xi)i∈S to be a feasible
allocation that minimizes the total delay, i.e.,
∑
i∈S,j∈Mk,k∈[d] djkxijk. Since the delays are the same for
each agent the total delay minimizes when the agents in S gets
∑
i∈S rik units of machines of type k with
the smallest delay. Therefore, if we assign the next rik units of machines of type k with the smallest delay
to agent iˆ then (xi)i∈(S∪iˆ) would be the feasible allocation that minimizes the total delay. Therefore, this
problem satisfies the extensibility condition.
Restricted assignment with laminar families.
Lemma 15. Restricted assignment with laminar families satisfies the extensibility condition if the following
assumption holds for the instance
• (Monotonicity) ∀i, i′ ∈ A, such that Si′ ⊂ Si then maxj∈Si\S′i djk ≤ minj′∈S′i dj′k for each type
k ∈ [d].
Proof. Since the requirement and variables for set of machines of each type is separate, it is enough to
show this for k = 1. Consider an arbitrary set of agents T and an agent outside of this set iˆ. Let T ′ =
T ∪ i. Let (xi)i∈T to be a feasible allocation that minimizes total delay, i.e.,
∑
i∈T d.xi. For simplicity
let Siˆ = {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that d1 ≤ · · · ≤ dm. Consider two agent i and i′. Note that if j ∈ Si and
j ∈ Si′ then ∀j′ ∈ Si such that dj′ ≤ dj we have j ∈ Si′ and vice versa because Sis form a laminar
family and the monotonicity condition. Therefore, an optimal allocation allocates only a prefix of machines
in Siˆ. Let’s assign to iˆ the next riˆ machines with smallest delay in subset Siˆ. We claim the new allocation
(xi)i∈S′ is minimizing the total delay, i.e.,
∑
i∈S′ d.xi. Let’s prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose
the allocation is not optimal. Therefore there exists an optimal allocation (x′i)i∈S′∪{ˆi} with less total delay.
Suppose allocationX ′ has allocated machines 1 through l′ in set Siˆ and allocationX has allocated machines
1 through l in set Siˆ. Note that in allocation X
′ we can assume agent iˆ is getting the last machines in X ′
among the machines that has been allocated in Si because if there exists agent i¯ that has allocation on the
right side of the first machine that is allocated to iˆ then we can swap the allocations so the total delay
wouldn’t change. If l = l′ then the delay of agent iˆ is the same in X and X ′. This is a contradiction
because then it would conclude the total delay allocation of (x′i)i∈S is less than total delay of (xi)i∈S but
we assumed X is an optimal allocation for S. There are two cases.
Case1. l < l′. Consider allocationX ′ after removing agent iˆ. Since iˆ is getting the last machines it is easy to
see the remaining allocation is optimal for S. Since l < l′ there are agents that have less allocation in Si in
X compare to X ′. Because of monotonicity assumption they have been allocated to machines with highest
delay instead of available machines in Si. This is a contradiction with the fact X is a optimal allocation for
S.
Case2. l > l′. This case is very similar to the last case. With the same argument we can argue that this case
has contradiction with the fact X ′ is an optimal allocation.
Network Flows. Recall that in this setting agent i wants to sent ri units of flow from s to t in a directed
(graph) network where each edge has a capacity and cost per unit flow specified. Here edges are goods, and
the covering constraints of agent i has variable fie for each edge e representing her flow on edge e. The
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constraints impose flow conservation at all nodes except s and t, and that net outgoing and incoming flow at
s and t respectively is ri.
Lemma 16. A series-parallel network satisfies the extensibility condition.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary set of agents S and an agent outside of this set iˆ. Let (fi)i∈S to be a feasible
min cost flow. Let’s remove the allocated capacities from the graph and allocate min cost flow of size riˆ to
agent iˆ in the remaining graph. It is known that this greedy algorithm gives a min cost flow of size
∑
i∈S∪iˆ ri
[3].
We can consider independent copies of any of these special cases above. E.g., each agent might want
some machines for job processing, as well as send some flows through a network, but have a common budget
for both together. Note that it would remain extensible because each copy is independent and extensible
itself.
E Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we characterize equilibria of most general market instances. Recall that allocation xi of
agent i has to satisfy its covering constraints CC(i). Next we derive sufficient conditions for prices p and
allocation X to be an equilibrium. As we discussed in Section 2, given prices p the optimal bundle of each
agent i is captured by
min
∑
j∈G dijxij
s.t.
∑
j∈G aijkxij ≥ rik ∀k ∈ C∑
j∈G pjxij ≤ mi
xij ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ G
(OB-LP(i))
It is well know that solutions of a linear program are exactly the ones that satisfy its complementary
slackness conditions [50]. Let βik and γi be the dual variables of first and second of constraints in OB-
LP(i). Then, corresponding complementary slackness conditions are,
∀k ∈ C : ∑j∈G aijkxij ≥ rik ⊥ βik ≥ 0
∀j ∈ G : dij ≥
∑
k aijkβik − γipj ⊥ xij ≥ 0∑
j∈G pjxij ≤ mi ⊥ γi ≥ 0
(11)
Here ⊥ symbol between two inequalities means that both inequalities should be satisfied, and at least
one of them has to hold with equality. Next, under a mild condition of sufficient demand (see Definition 4),
we show that w.r.t. equilibrium prices γi > 0, ∀i ∈ A. This would also imply that each agent spends all of
its budget at equilibrium (thereby maximizing profit of the seller). We note that the following lemma is not
needed for Theorem 3, but will be used to show the reverse result in Lemma 19, namely equilibrium prices
and allocation gives solutions of the LP (λ) and DLP (λ) for appropriately chosen parameter vector λ.
Lemma 17. Let (X∗,p∗) be an equilibrium of marketM satisfying sufficient demand, and for all i ∈ A let
(γ∗i ,β
∗
i ) be the corresponding dual variables of OB-LP(i) at p
∗. Then γ∗i > 0, ∀i ∈ A. In other words,
every agent spends all her money at any equilibrium.
Proof. Since X∗ is an equilibrium allocation, no good is over demanded. Therefore, we know that x∗i ≤
1, ∀i ∈ A. Let p0 be all zero price vector. By sufficient demand condition x∗i cannot be an optimal
allocation of agent i at prices p0. We will derive a contradiction to this if γ∗i = 0 for some agent i.
To the contrary suppose for agent i ∈ A, we have γi = 0. Since x∗i , γ∗i and β∗i satisfy complementary
slackness conditions (12) of OB-LP(i) at prices p∗, it is easy to see that they also satisfy these conditions at
prices p0. This would imply that x∗i is an optimal allocation of agent i at prices p
0, a contradiction.
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Note that due to Lemma 17, it is no loss of generality to assume γi > 0, ∀i ∈ A. We simplify the
conditions with change of variables λi = 1/γi and αik = βik/γi, and write conditions for all the agents
together.
∀i ∈ A, ∀k ∈ C : ∑j∈G aijkxij ≥ rik ⊥ αik ≥ 0
∀i ∈ A,∀j ∈ G : λidij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pj ⊥ xij ≥ 0
∀i ∈ A : ∑j∈G pjxij = mi and λi > 0 (12)
At market equilibrium prices, every agent should get an optimal bundle, and market should clear, i.e.,
Supply constraints are satisfied and every good with positive price should be fully sold (see Section 2 for the
formal definition of market equilibrium). Since optimal allocations at given prices are solutions of OB-LP(i)
for each i, they must satisfy (12). This follows from the fact that primal-dual feasibility and complementary
slackness conditions are necessary and sufficient for solutions of a linear program. We get the following
characterization.
Lemma 18. If (λˆ, Xˆ, pˆ, αˆ) satisfies (12), and ∀j ∈ G, ∑i∈A xˆij ≤ 1 ⊥ pˆj ≥ 0, then (Xˆ, pˆ) constitutes
an equilibrium allocation and prices.
Motivated from Lemma 18 we next define parameterized LP that captures complementary slackness
conditions of OB-LP(i) for all the agents together. Suppose we are given λi’s, let us define the following
linear program parameterized by the λ vector, that we call LP (λ), and its dual DLP (λ) (same as (2)
defined in Section 4):
LP (λ) DLP (λ)
min :
∑
i,j λidijxij
s.t.
∑
j∈G aijkxij ≥ rik ∀i ∈ A, k ∈ C∑
i∈A xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ G
xij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G
max :
∑
i∈A,k∈C rikαik −
∑
j pj
s.t. λidij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pj ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G
αik, pj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ G, k ∈ C
Using the equilibrium characterization of Lemma 18 together with complementary slackness conditions
between constraints of LP (λ) and DLP (λ), next we show that solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ) exactly
capture the equilibria if given appropriate value of parameter vector λ.
Theorem 3. For a given λ > 0 if an optimal solution X of LP (λ) and an optimal solution (α,p) of
DLP (λ) satisfy Budget constraint(i) for all agents i ∈ A with equality, then they constitute an equilibrium
of marketM.
Proof. It suffices to show that (λ, αˆ, pˆ, Xˆ) satisfy conditions of Lemma 18. Out of these the last one of
(12) is already assumed in the hypothesis. For the remaining conditions, let us write the complementary
slackness conditions for LP (λ). ∑
j
aijkxij ≥ rik ⊥ αik ≥ 0, ∀i, k (13)
λidij ≥
∑
k
aijkαik − pj ⊥ xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j (14)
∑
i
xij ≤ 1 ⊥ pj ≥ 0, ∀j (15)
Conditions (13) and (14) are exactly the first two conditions of (12), and (15) ensures market clearing.
Thus proof follows using Lemma 18.
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Next we show converse of the above theorem under sufficient demand condition.
Lemma 19. If marketM satisfies sufficient demand and (Xˆ, pˆ) is its equilibrium, then Xˆ and (αˆ, pˆ) gives
solution of LP (λˆ) and DLP (λˆ) respectively for some λˆ and αˆ.
Proof. Due to optimal bundle condition of equilibrium we know that xˆi is an optimal solution of OB-LP(i)
at prices pˆ. Let βˆik and γˆi be the value of corresponding dual variable in (11). Using Lemma 17 we have
γˆi > 0, ∀i. Then it is easy to see using (12) that for λˆi = 1/γˆi, ∀i ∈ A and αˆik = βˆikγˆi , ∀i ∈ A, k ∈
C, (Xˆ, αˆ, pˆ) satisfy complementary slackness conditions of LP (λˆ) and DLP (λˆ). Therefore the proof
follows.
Using the equilibrium characterization given by Theorem 3 crucially, we design a polynomial-time
algorithm to find an equilibrium for markets with extensibility (Definition 3) in Section 4.
F Missing Proofs and Details of Section 4
The proof of first theorem of Section 4, namely Theorem 3 is in Appendix E where we characterize market
equilibria. Next we give proof of Lemma 1. For this we basically use the fact that any pair of primal, dual
solutions of a linear program has to satisfy complementary slackness [50]. Recall the LP (λ) and DLP (λ)
of (2).
LP (λ) : DLP (λ)
min :
∑
i λi
∑
j dijxij
s.t.
∑
j aijkxij ≥ rik, ∀k∑
i xij ≤ 1, ∀i
xij ≥ 0, ∀(i, j)
max :
∑
i,k rikαik −
∑
j pj
s.t. λidij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pj , ∀(i, j)
pj ≥ 0, ∀j; αik ≥ 0, ∀(i, k)
(16)
For any given λ > 0, the optimal solutions of the LP (λ), namely X , and DLP (λ), namely (α,p) has
to satisfy the following complementary slackness conditions.
∀(i, k) : αik ≥ 0 ⊥
∑
j aijkxij ≥ rik
∀j : pj ≥ 0 ⊥
∑
i xij ≤ 1
∀(i, j) : xij ≥ 0 ⊥ λidij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pj
(17)
Recall that the ⊥ symbol between two inequalities means that both inequalities should be satisfied, and
at least one of them has to hold with equality. Also recall that for subset S ⊆ A, we defined delayS(X,p) =∑
i∈S,j dijxij and payS(X,p) =
∑
i∈S,j xijpj , and for ease of notation we use delayi when S = {i} and
similarly payi. Using this we first show a relation between delayi and payi next.
Lemma 20. For a given λ > 0 if Xˆ and (αˆ, pˆ) are optimal solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ) respectively,
while X ′ and (α′,p′) are feasible in LP (λ) and DLP (λ) then, such that,
∀i : λidelayi(Xˆ) =
∑
k rikαˆik − payi(Xˆ, pˆ)
∀i : λidelayi(X ′) ≥
∑
k rikα
′
ik − payi(X ′,p′)
Proof. For feasible solutions we have ∀(i, k), α′ik ≥ 0 and
∑
j aijkx
′
ij ≥ rik. Multiplying the two and
summing over k for each i gives,
∑
k α
′
ik
∑
j aijkx
′
ij ≥
∑
k α
′
ikrik, ∀i. Another pair of constraints are
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∀(i, j), x′ij ≥ 0 and λidij ≥
∑
k aijkα
′
ik − p′j . Multiplying the two gives,
∀i : λidelay(X ′) = λi
∑
j x
′
ijdij
≥ ∑j x′ij(∑k aijkα′ik)−∑j p′jx′ij
=
∑
k α
′
ik
∑
j aijkx
′
ij − payi(X ′,p′)
≥ ∑k α′ikrik − payi(X ′,p′)
This gives the second part. Since optimal solutions satisfy complementary slackness, all inequalities satisfy
with equality in the above for (Xˆ, αˆ, pˆ) and we get the first part.
Recall notation [n] = {1, . . . , n} for any positive integer n, and Definition 2 of an allocation X being
jointlyoptimalfor a subset of agents S.
Lemma 1. Given λ, partition agents by equality of λi into sets S1, . . . , Sd such that λ(S1) < · · · < λ(Sd).
1. At any optimal solution X of LP (λ) delay is minimized first for set Sd, then for S(d−1), and so on,
finally for S1. This is equivalent toX being jointly optimal for each Tg, ∀g ∈ [d] where Tg = ∪dq=gSq,,
and for any other optimal solution Y we have delaySg(Y ) = delaySg(X), ∀g ∈ [d].
2. Given two dual optimal solutions (α,p) and (α′,p′), if the first part of dual objective is same at both
for some g ∈ [d], i.e., ∑i∈Sg ,k rikαik = ∑i∈Sg ,k rikα′ik, then for any optimal solution X of LP (λ),
paySg(X,p) = paySg(X,p
′).
3. Given two optimal solutions X and X ′ of LP (λ), and an optimal solution (α,p) of DLP (λ), if for
any subset S ⊆ Sg for g ∈ [d], delayS(X) ≤ delayS(X ′), then payS(X,p) ≥ payS(X ′,p). The
former is strict iff the latter is strict too.
Proof. Note that, T1 = A, Td = Sd, and Sg = Tg \ Tg+1, ∀g ∈ [d− 1]. For the first part, let us rewrite the
objective function of LP (λ) as
d∑
g=2
(λ(Sg)− λ(Sg−1))
∑
i∈Tg ,j
dijxij + λ(S1)
∑
i∈T1,j
dijxij
SinceM satisfies extensibility, we can construct a minimum delay allocation X∗ where Sd gets the best,
then next best to Sd−1, and so on to finally S1. In other words, X∗ is jointly optimal for Tg, ∀g ≤ d. Let
X ′ be an arbitrary optimal solution of LP (λ), not constructed as X∗. Then,
∀1 ≤ g ≤ d,
∑
i∈Tg ,j
dijx
∗
ij ≤
∑
i∈Tg ,j
dijx
′
ij ,
To the contrary suppose at least one is strict inequality. Then, since λ(Sd) > λ(Sd−1) > · · · > λ(S1) > 0
we have
λ(S1)
∑
i∈T1,j dijx
∗
ij +
∑d
g=2(λ(Sg)− λ(Sg−1))
∑
i∈Tg ,j dijx
∗
ij <
λ(S1)
∑
i∈T1,j dijx
′
ij +
∑d
g=2(λ(Sg)− λ(Sg−1))
∑
i∈Tg ,j dijx
′
ij
A contradiction to X ′ being optimal solution of LP (λ). Since any minimum delay allocation for a subset
gives the same total delay, the first part follows.
The second part essentially follows by applying Lemma 20 twice. For optimal pair X and (αˆ, pˆ), and
pair X and (α′,p′) we get, ∀g
λ(Sg)delaySg(X) =
∑
i∈Sg ,k
rikαˆik−paySg(X, pˆ), and λ(Sg)delaySg(X) =
∑
i∈Sg ,k
rikα
′
ik−paySg(X,p′)
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implying, paySg(X, pˆ) = paySg(X,p
′) if and only if
∑
i∈Sg ,k rikαˆik =
∑
i∈Sg ,k rikα
′
ik.
For the third part, applying Lemma 20 to each agent i ∈ S and then taking the sum gives λ(Sg)delayS(Xˆ) =∑
i∈S,k rikαik − payS(Xˆ,p) and λ(Sg)delayS(X ′) =
∑
i∈S,k rikαik − payS(X ′,p). Combining the two,
we get λ(Sg)(delayS(Xˆ)− delayS(X ′)) = payS(X ′,p)− payS(Xˆ,p), thereby the lemma follows.
Next we show existence of a primal-dual solution where every agent spends exactly her money if BB
(budget balance) and SC (subset condition) of Definition 5 are satisfied at the current value of λ and p.
Recall the definition of proper pair (λ,p) (Definition 6).
Lemma 2. If pair (λ∗,p∗) is proper for λ∗ > 0 then there exists an optimal solution X∗ of the primal
LP (λ∗) such that payi(X∗,p∗) = mi, ∀i ∈ A.
Proof. Let τi(X) = mi − payi(X,p∗). Without loss of generality suppose agents are ordered such that
τ1(X) ≥ τ2(X) ≥ · · · ≥ τn(X). Define Tk(X) =
∑
1≤i≤k τi(X). Let’s define the following potential
function for every allocation X . The potential function is f(X) =
∑
k Tk(X).
Let X∗ be an optimal solution of LP (λ∗) that minimizes f . Order the agents such that τ1(X∗) ≥
τ2(X
∗) ≥ · · · ≥ τn(X∗). Note that Tn(X∗) = 0 (conditionBB). Therefore, Ti(X∗) ≥ 0 ∀i since τis are in
decreasing order. Therefore, f(X∗) ≥ 0. If f(X∗) = 0 then it must be the case that Ti(X∗) = 0, ∀i ∈ [n]
and τi(X∗) = 0, ∀i ∈ [n]. This gives mi − payi(X∗,p∗) = 0, ∀i as we desired.
To the contrary suppose f(X∗) > 0. Let Xˆ be an optimal allocation of LP (λ∗) where delay of agent 1
is minimum, then of agent 2, and so on, finally of agent n.
Claim 5.
∑
i≤r τi(Xˆ) ≤ 0, ∀r ∈ [n].
Proof. Fix an r ∈ [n] and define S = {1, . . . , r} and S¯ = {r + 1, . . . , n}. Since the total delay of all
the agents is same at both X∗ and Xˆ , their total payment is also same (first and third part of Lemma 1).
Therefore it suffices to show
∑
i∈S¯ τi(Xˆ) ≥ 0 because
∑
1≤i≤n τi(Xˆ) = 0. Let’s define Lg = S¯ ∩ Sg.
Note that Xˆ is an optimal allocation in which delay of S¯ is maximized. We will show that in an optimal
allocation if delay of S¯ is maximized then delay of Lg is maximized for all g and som(Lg) ≥ payLg(Xˆ,p∗)
(SC condition). Therefore, m(S¯) ≥ payS¯(Xˆ,p∗). That completes the proof.
In the following we show that if the delay of S¯ is maximized then delay of Lg maximized for all g in an
optimal allocation. Consider an optimal allocationX ′ ofLP (λ∗) which is constructed by first optimizing for
Sd\Ld, then Ld, then Sd−1\Ld−1 then Ld−1 and so on. This is a valid construction due to the extensibility
property. We claim that X ′ is an optimal allocation which maximizes delay of Lg, ∀g individually. Total
delay of Sg ∀g is the same for all optimal allocations (Lemma 1) and delay of (∪dq=g+1Sq) ∪ (Sg\Lg) is
minimized in X ′. Therefore, delay of Sg\Lg is minimized in X ′ and so delay of Lg is maximized since sum
of delays of Sg\Lg and Lg is constant among all optimal allocations.
Using the above claim we get ∃rˆ such that ∑i≤rˆ τi(Xˆ) < 0 because otherwise τi(Xˆ) = 0, ∀i and
f(Xˆ) = 0. Therefore, ∑
r≤n
∑
i≤r
τi(Xˆ) < 0 (18)
Let’s define X(δ) = (1− δ)X∗ + δXˆ . Since optimal solutions of an LP forms a convex set, X(δ) is an
optimal solution of LP (λ∗) for all δ ∈ [0 1]. For every pair i and j such that i < j and τi(X∗) = τj(X∗),
we assume ∂τi(X(δ))∂δ >
∂τj(X(δ))
∂δ . Note that the assumption is without loss of generality. Therefore, there
exists δ small enough such that the order of τi’s is the same for X(δ) as at X∗. Considering that small δ, we
have the following
f(X(δ)) =
∑
r
∑
i≤r
τi(X(δ))
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=
∑
r
∑
i≤r
(τi(X
∗)− δ(τi(X∗)− τi(Xˆ)))
= f(X∗)− δ(f(X∗)−
∑
r≤n
∑
i≤r
τi(Xˆ))
= (1− δ)f(X∗) + δ(
∑
r≤n
∑
i≤r
τi(Xˆ)))
< f(X∗) (Using (18))
Therefore, we get f(X(δ)) < f(X∗) which is a contradiction to X∗ being optimal solution where f is
minimized.
While searching for the next segment during the algorithm, we would like to fix total payment of the
segments that already have been created. Note that unlike scheduling on a single machine (Section 3), in
this general setting we are not able to fix the allocation of the agents on the previous segments. In fact the
allocation will heavily depend on what segments are created later on. However from Lemma 1 we know
that the total delay of previous segments will remain unchanged. If delay is fixed then payments can be
controlled using the last part of Lemma 1 if prices of goods they buy also remain unchanged. Therefore the
only way to ensure that total payments are fixed seems to be, fixing prices of goods they are buying, and
also hold their dual variables αiks. Next lemma shows that this is indeed possible. In a number of proofs
that follows we will use the following version of Farkas’ lemma.
Lemma 21 (Farkas’ lemma [51]). Given a matrix A, if the system Az = b and z ≥ 0 is infeasible then
there exists vector y such that yTA ≥ 0 and yT b < 0.
Recall notation 1S ∈ {0, 1}|A| for a subset S ⊆ A denoting indicator vector of set S.
Lemma 3. Given a λ, partition agents into S1, . . . , Sd by equality of λi, where λ(S1) < · · · < λ(Sd). For
R ⊆ Sd consider primal optimal Xˆ that is jointly optimal for R, and let (αˆ, pˆ) be a dual optimal. Consider
for some a > 0, the vector λ′ = λ+a1R. Then Xˆ is optimal in LP (λ′) and there exists an optimal solution
(α′,p′) of DLP (λ′) such that,
∀j : p′j ≥ pˆj and
∑
i/∈R xˆij > 0⇒ p′j = pˆj
∀i /∈ R, ∀k, α′ik = αˆik .
Proof. Due to Lemma 1 it follows that Xˆ is an optimal solution of LP (λ′). Suppose p′ = pˆ+ δ, then it is
sufficient to show that the following system is feasible.
δ ≥ 0
∀j s.t. ∑i 6∈R xˆij > 0 or ∑i xˆij < cj : δj = 0 (19)
∀i ∈ R,∀j s.t. xˆij > 0 : λ′idij =
∑
k aijkα
′
ik − pˆj − δj (20)
∀i ∈ R,∀j s.t. xˆij = 0 : λ′idij ≥
∑
k aijkα
′
ik − pˆj − δj (21)
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the system is infeasible. We will show a contradiction using
Farkas’ lemma (Lemma 21). To convert (21) to equality we add slack variable γij . In addition, we remove
all δj that are set to zero in (19) from (20) and (21), and remove (19) itself from the system. Let T denote
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the set of goods j such that
∑
i 6∈R xˆij > 0 or
∑
i xˆij < cj and T¯ denote the set of good not in T . The
remaining system can be written as follows in Az = b form in variables δjs and γijs:
∀i ∈ R,∀j s.t. xˆij > 0 & (j ∈ T¯ ) : λ′idij + pˆj =
∑
k aijkα
′
ik − δj
∀i ∈ R,∀j s.t. xˆij = 0 & (j ∈ T¯ ) : λ′idij + pˆj =
∑
k aijkα
′
ik − δj + γij
∀i ∈ R,∀j s.t. xˆij > 0 & (j ∈ T ) : λ′idij + pˆj =
∑
k aijkα
′
ik
∀i ∈ R,∀j s.t. xˆij = 0 & (j ∈ T ) : λ′idij + pˆj =
∑
k aijkα
′
ik + γij
(22)
Due to Farkas’ lemma if the above system is infeasible then there exists y such that yTA = 0 and yTb < 0.
That is for variables yij , ∀i ∈ R, ∀j:
yTA ≥ 0⇒

∀i ∈ R,∀k : ∑j aijkyij ≥ 0
∀i ∈ R,∀j s.t. xij = 0 : yij ≥ 0
∀j ∈ T¯ : ∑i∈R yij ≤ 0 (23)
yT b < 0⇒ ∑i∈R,j λ′idijyij +∑i∈R,j pˆjyij < 0 (24)
Let’s consider two cases.
Case 1.
∑
i∈R,j dijyij ≥ 0. Since ∀i ∈ R, λ(Sd) = λi < λ′i = λ(Sd) + τ and yT b < 0 we get
λ(Sd)
∑
i∈R,j dijyij +
∑
i∈R,j pˆjyij < 0 (25)
On the other hand, note that
λ(Sd)
∑
i∈R,j dijyij +
∑
i∈R,j pˆjyij =
∑
i∈R,j yij(λidij + pˆj)
≥∑i∈R,j yij(∑k aijkαˆik) (∵ (pˆ, αˆ) is a solution for DLP (λ))
=
∑
i∈R
∑
k αˆik
∑
j yijaijk ≥ 0 (Using (23))
That is a contradiction.
Case 2.
∑
i∈R,j dijyij < 0. We will show that Xˆ does not give min-cost allocation to agents of R. Consider
xij = xˆij + yij , ∀i ∈ R, ∀j for a small amount  > 0 and xij = xˆij , ∀i /∈ R, ∀j. Using (23) it follows
that X is feasible in LP (λ). In addition,∑
i
λi
∑
j
dij(xij − xˆij) = λ(Sg)
∑
i∈R, j
dij(yij) < 0
This contradicts Xˆ being optimal solution of LP (λ).
While creating next segment we need to maintain BB and SC conditions for all the previous segments.
Lemma 3 ensures that prices of goods bought by agents in previous segments is fixed. If we also manage to
ensure that total delay remains unchanged for previous segments, then we will be able to leverage properties
from Lemma 1 to show BB and SC do remain satisfied for previous segments. The next lemma establishes
exactly this.
Lemma 22. Given λ > 0 let the partition of agents by equality of λi be S1, . . . , Sk−1, A′ such that λ(S1) <
· · · < λ(Sk−1) < λ(A′). For an Sk ⊂ A′, letλ′ ≥ λ be such that the induced partition is S1, . . . , Sk, A′\Sk
and λ(S1) < · · · < λ(Sk) < λ(A′ \ Sk). Then for any group g < k, we have delaySg(X) = delaySg(X ′)
where X and X ′ are solutions of LP (λ) and LP (λ′) respectively. And for any subset T ⊂ Sg,
max
X optimal of LP (λ)
delayT (X) = max
X optimal of LP (λ′)
delayT (X)
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Proof. An optimal solution of both LP (λ) and LP (λ′) first minimizes total delay of A′ then of Sk−1 and
so on finally of S1 (Lemma 1). Within A′, LP (λ′) may first minimize for A′ \ Sk and then of Sk. Thus,
the optimal solution set may shrink as we go from λ to λ′. However, due to extensibility, if X and X ′
are optimal solution of LP (λ) and LP (λ′) then, delaySg(X) = delaySg(X
′). Further, by Lemma 1 the
optimal solution of both LP (λ) and LP (λ′) where delayT is maximized essentially minimizes total delay
of A′ ∪k−1q=g+1 Sq ∪ (Sg \ T ) and then of T , then of ∪g−1q=1Sq. By extensibility condition delayT at any such
allocation remains the same.
The next lemma shows that if before we start our search for next segment, already created segments
S1, . . . , Sk−1 satisfies BB and SC w.r.t. (λcur,pcur), and the remaining agents satisfy SC, then for the
value of a where minimum of fa is zero, the minimizer gives the next segment without ruining the former.
Recall that, for a given a ≥ 0 and  > 0,λnew = λa + 1A′\Sk , and the prices p
new are valid and optimal
for DLP (λnew), where 1A′\Sk is an indicator vector of set A
′ \ Sk, and λa as defined in (4). We will
also use notation pa to denote prices at the valid optimal solution of DLP (λa) (See (5)), i.e., in the sense
guaranteed by Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. Suppose that for some a ≥ 0,
Sk ∈ arg minS⊆A′,S 6=∅{fλa,pa(S)}.
Further, suppose that fλa,pa(Sk) = 0, and Sk be a maximal such set. Then there exists a rational number
 > 0 of polynomial-size such that, w.r.t. (λnew,pnew) as defined above, S1, . . . , Sk satisfy both BB and
SC, and A′ \ Sk satisfy SC.
Proof. First part of Lemma 1 implies that every optimal solution of LP (λnew) minimizes delay of sets
A′ \ Sk, Sk, . . . , S1 in that sequence, while optimal of LP (λcur) minimizes delay of sets in sequence A′,
Sk−1,. . . , S1. Therefore clearly the set of optimal solutions of LP (λnew) is a subset of the optimal solutions
ofLP (λcur). This together with the fact that at (λcur,pcur)BB and SC are satisfied for each g ≤ k−1, Sg,
for any optimal X ′ of LP (λnew), we have paySg(X
′,pcur) = m(Sg). Let αcur be corresponding dual
variable, then Lemma 20 gives λ(Sg)delaySg(X
′) =
∑
i∈Sg ,k rikα
cur
ik − paySg(X ′,pcur)
Since pnew is a valid solution of DLP (λnew), at corresponding valid (αnew,pnew) value of αnewi
for each i /∈ A′ is same as αcuri. Using Lemma 20 we get λ(Sg)delaySg(X ′) =
∑
i∈Sg ,k rikα
new
ik −
paySg(X
′,pnew) =
∑
i∈Sg ,k rikα
cur
ik − paySg(X ′,pnew). This together with the above equality gives
paySg(X
′,pnew) = paySg(X
′,pcur) = m(S). Hence BB is satisfied by S1,. . . ,Sk−1 at (λnew,pnew). By
the same reasoning, and using Lemma 22 and third part of Lemma 1 we get that they also satisfy SC.
Note thatλnew isλa with  added to λis of agents inA′\Sk. And pnew is a valid optimal ofDLP (λnew)
obtained starting from pa where αiks of agents not in A′ \ Sk, and prices of goods “bought by them” are
held fixed (Lemma 3). Since function fλ,p keeps track of surplus budget, and Sk is the minimizer of fλa,pa
where surplus budget of Sk is zero at pa in addition, it follows that for every subset of Sk the surplus budget
is non-negative. Thus we get SC for Sk at (λnew,pnew) using Lemma 22. For BB note that we have
λnew(Sk) < λ
new(A′ \ Sk). Hence, due to first part of Lemma 1, optimal allocations X of LP (λnew) will
give first to A′ \ Sk minimum delay, and then next minimum to Sk. This is exactly same as maximizing
delaySk(X) among optimal of LP (λ
a) (where λa(S∗) = λa(A′ \ S∗) > λa(Sg), ∀g ≤ k − 1). Due to
the fact that fλa,pa(Sk) = 0, at such an allocation we also have m(Sk) = paySk(X,p
a). This will be
same as paySk(X,p
new) due to construction of pnew from pa in Lemma 3. Since at every such allocation
delaySk(X) remains the same, paySk(X,p
new) remains the same (Lemma 22).
For the second part, namely A′ \ Sk satisfies SC w.r.t. (λnew,pnew), it suffices to show existence of
 > 0 such that fλnew,pnew(T ) ≥ 0, ∀T ⊂ A′ \ Sk. We will show this in Lemma 26 below.
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Above lemma implies that if the minimizer of fa gives zero value, then it forms the next segment.
One crucial task therefore is to find a minimizer of fa efficiently. Next lemma and (7) show that fa is a
submodular function, implying its minimizer can be found in polynomial time.
Lemma 5. Given a ≥ 0, function fa is submodular over set A′.
Proof. For ease of notation let us use f to denote function fa, λ = λa, p = pa, and α be the dual vector
that forms valid solution of DLP (λa) together with pa. Recall that agent set A is partitioned by equality of
λai into sets S1, . . . , S(k−1), A
′ such that λa(S1) < · · · < λa(S(k−1)) < λa(A′).
Let S ⊂ T ⊂ A′ and a 6∈ T . Define S′ = S ∪ {a} and T ′ = T ∪ {a}. It suffices to show the following
f(S′)− f(S) ≥ f(T ′)− f(T )
Let’s recall the following two complementary slackness conditions.
∀i ∈ A, ∀k ∈ C : ∑j∈G aijkxij ≥ rik ⊥ αik ≥ 0
∀i ∈ A,∀j ∈ G : λidij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pj ⊥ xij ≥ 0
Using these it is easy to get the following, where λ∗ is the λi of agents in A′ which we know is the same.
λ∗delayS(X) = payS(X,p) +
∑
i∈S,k
αikrik (26)
For set S ⊆ A′ let us denote its complement within A′ by S¯ = A′ \ S. From the first part of Lemma 1
we know that optimal solution of LP (λ) will first minimize delay of set A′ since it has highest λ value.
Note that, S¯ = S¯′ ∪ {a}. If XS is an optimal solution of LP (λ) where delay of S is maximized then by
extensibility it can constructed as follows: within minimization for set A′ first minimizing delay for S¯′, then
for a, and lastly for S. Then we have:
f(S′)− f(S) = ma − payS′(XS ,p) + payS(XS ,p)
= ma −
∑
i∈S′,k αikrik + λ
∗delayS′(XS) +
∑
i∈S,k αikrik − λ∗delayS(XS) (Using (26))
= ma −
∑
k αˆakrak + λ
∗(delayS′(XS)− delayS(XS))
= ma −
∑
k αˆakrak + λ
∗delaya(XS) (XS construction)
Similarly we get,
f(T ′)− f(T ) = ma −
∑
k
αˆakrak + λ
∗delaya(X
T )
where XT is an optimal solution where delay of T is maximized, which can be constructed by first mini-
mizing delay for T¯ ′, next for a, and last for T . Recall that S ⊂ T and so T¯ ⊂ S¯. We constructed XS and
XT by first optimizing for S¯′ and T¯ ′ and then adding a. Therefore, delaya(XS) ≤ delaya(XT ) and so
f(S′)− f(S) ≥ f(T ′)− f(T )
The NextSeg subroutine does binary search on the value of a to find the one where minimizer of fa
gives zero. In next few lemmas we show why binary search is the right tool to find this critical value of a.
Essentially we show Lemma 6 which has four parts and we will show them in separate lemmas.
Lemma 23. If A′ satisfies SC condition of Definition 5 at (λcur,pcur) then fλcur,pcur(T ) ≥ 0, ∀T ⊂ A′.
In other words g(0) ≥ 0.
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Proof. Since A′ satisfies SC w.r.t. (λcur,pcur), by definition of SC condition (Definition 5), it follows
that for any T ⊂ A′, m(T ) − payT (XT ,pcur) ≥ 0, where XT is an optimal solution of LP (λcur) where
delayT (X) is maximized. Thus, fλcur,pcur(T ) = m(T )− payT (XT ,pcur) ≥ 0.
Lemma 24. Assuming sufficient demand, for any T ⊂ A′, value fa(T ) monotonically and continuously
decreases with increase in a. Further, for any given a ≥ 0, ∃a′ > a such that fa′(A′) < fa(A′).
Proof. There is a unique valid price vector pa and pa
′
constituting optimal solution of DLP (λa) and
DLP (λa
′
). If we apply Lemma 3 for λ = λa and λ′ = λa
′
, then we get that pa ≤ pa′ . Note that the
partition of agents by equality of λi is the same at both λa and λa
′
and further their ordering by the value
of λ(S) is also same. Therefore, due to the first part of Lemma 1 every optimal solutions of LP (λa) are the
same LP (λa
′
). Hence, among them the ones minimizing delayT (X) for any given T ⊂ A′ are the same,
say XT is one of them. Note that delayT remains the same at all such allocations.
fa(T ) = m(T )− payT (XT ,pa) = m(T )−
∑
i∈T,j
xTijp
a
j ≥ m(T )−
∑
i∈T,j
xTijp
a′
j = fa′(T )
Since solutions of linear programs change continuously with change in parameters, the first part follows.
For the second part, we know that ∀a′ ≥ a, valid prices pa′ ≥ pa from the above. It suffices to
show that ∃a′ ≥ a such that pa′j > paj for some good j that is bought by agents of A′. Suppose not, then
pa
′
= pa, ∀a′ ≥ a since prices of the rest of the goods are fixed anyway. Let pˆ = pa, λˆ = λa, and Xˆ
be an optimal solution of LP (λˆ). Note that Xˆ is an optimal of LP (λa
′
) as well for any a′ > a. Then, the
following system has a solution for any a′ ≥ a, since pˆ together with some α gives a optimal solution of
DLP (λa
′
) that satisfies complementarity with Xˆ . Here α are variables, and λˆ = λˆ(A′).
∀i ∈ A′, ∀j : xˆij > 0⇒ (λˆ+ δ)dij =
∑
k aijkαik − pˆj
∀i ∈ A′, ∀j : xˆij = 0⇒ (λˆ+ δ)dij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pˆj
∀i ∈ A′, ∀k : ∑j aijkxˆij > rik ⇒ αik = 0
α ≥ 0
Removing αik variables that are set to zero, and then applying Farkas’ lemma (Lemma 21) we get that
following system in xoij variables is infeasible for any δ ≥ 0:
∀i ∈ A′, ∀k : ∑j aijkxˆij = rik ⇒∑j aijkxoij ≥ 0
∀i ∈ A′, ∀k : xˆij = 0⇒ xoij ≥ 0
(λˆ+ δ)
∑
i∈A′,j dijx
o
ij +
∑
i∈A′,j pˆjx
o
ij < 0
Let u ∈ A′ be an agent and let x′u be its optimal allocation at zero prices. Since ∀j, xˆuj ≤ 1 due
to feasibility in LP (λˆ), it can not be optimal at zero prices due to sufficient demand condition. Hence∑
j dujx
′
uj <
∑
j duj xˆuj . Set x
o
ij = 0, ∀i 6= u, ∀j, and xouj = x′uj − xˆuj , ∀j. Clearly Xo satisfies the
first set of conditions above for all i ∈ A′, i 6= u. For agent u since x′u is optimal of (Delay LP(i)), ∀k with∑
j aijkxˆij = rik, we have∑
j
aijkx
′
ij ≥ rik =
∑
j
aijkxˆij ⇒
∑
j
aijk(x
′
ij − xˆij) ≥ 0⇒
∑
j
aijkx
o
ij ≥ 0.
Second set of conditions are satisfied by construction. Hence setting δ >
|∑
i∈A′,j
pˆjxoij+λˆ
∑
i∈A′,j
dijx
o
ij)|
|∑
i∈A′,j
dijxoij | ,
makes the above feasible. A contradiction.
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Lemma 25. There exists a rational ah ≥ 0 of polynomial size such that g(ah) ≤ 0. Further, given existence
of a > 0 for set S ⊆ A′ such that fa(S) = 0, such an a can be found by solving a feasibility LP of
polynomial-size.
Proof. Since value of g(a) ≤ fa(S), ∀S ⊂ A′, it suffices to show that there exists some rational ah > 0
such that fah(A
′) ≤ 0. By definition of λa (4), partitions of agents by equality of λi and ordering of these
groups by value of it, are the same for all a ≥ 0. Let Xˆ be an optimal solution of LP (λ0). From the proof
of Lemma 24 we have that pa is monotonically increasing. By continuity of parameterized LP solutions we
know that it is increasing continuously. Therefore, it suffices to show that there is some a ≥ a0 such that
fa(A
′) ≤ 0 or in other words payA′(Xˆ,pa) ≥ m(A′).
To the contrary suppose not. Let λˆ = λ0 and pˆ = p0. Solve the following linear program where a, δjs
and αiks are variables, and λˆ = λˆ(A′), cj =
∑
i∈A′ xˆij ,
max :
∑
j(pˆj + δj)cj
s.t.
∀j : ∑
i/∈A′ xˆij > 0 or
∑
i xˆij < 1⇒ δj = 0
∀i ∈ A′,∀j : xˆij > 0⇒ (λˆ+ a)dij =
∑
k aijkαik − pˆj − δj
∀i ∈ A′,∀j : xˆij = 0⇒ (λˆ+ a)dij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pˆj − δj
∀i ∈ A′,∀k : ∑j aijkxˆij > rik ⇒ αik = 0
a ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0, α ≥ 0
Note that at any feasible point of the above, we have
∑
j(pˆj + δj)cj ≥ payA′(Xˆ,pa). It has a finite
optimal or else there is a a ≥ 0 where payA′(XT ,pa) ≥ m(T ). Let (a∗, δ∗,α∗) be an optimal solution. By
construction of above linear program pa
∗
= pˆ+δ is the valid price vector at λa
∗
. By Lemma 24, we can find
an a′ > a∗ where fa′(A′) < fa∗(A) ⇒ payA′(Xˆ,pa
′
) > payA′(Xˆ,p
a∗) ⇒ ∑j pa′j cj > ∑j pa∗j cj . If αa′
together with pa forms a valid optimal of DLP (λa
′
), then for δ′ = pa∗− pˆ andα′ = αa′ , point (a′, δ′,α′)
is a feasible point in the above linear program with better objective value. This contradicts optimality of
(a∗, δ∗,α∗) in it.
From the above argument and by monotonicity of fa(A′) in a (Lemma 24) it follows that there exists an
ah > 0 such that fah(A
′) = 0. Again since value of g(ah) ≤ fah(S), ∀S ⊆ A′, existence of such an ah
that is a rational number of polynomial sized implies the first part of the lemma. Next we will show this for
any S ⊆ A′ thereby proving the first and second part simultaneously.
For S ⊆ A′, existence of a ≥ 0 with fa(S) = 0 implies that valid (pa = pˆ + δ,αa) of DLP (λa) is a
feasible point in the following where Xˆ is the optimal solution of LP (λa) where delay of S is maximized:
∀j : ∑
i/∈A′ xˆij > 0 or
∑
i xˆij < 1⇒ δj = 0
∀i ∈ A′,∀j : xˆij > 0⇒ (λˆ+ a)dij =
∑
k aijkαik − pˆj − δj
∀i ∈ A′,∀j : xˆij = 0⇒ (λˆ+ a)dij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pˆj − δj
∀i ∈ A′,∀k : ∑j aijkxˆij > rik ⇒ αik = 0∑
i∈S,j(pˆj + δj)(
∑
i∈S xˆij) = m(S)
a ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0, α ≥ 0
Hence existence of rational such a of polynomial-size, and that it can be found by solving a feasibility
LP follow.
The next lemma follows essentially from Lemmas 23, 24, and 25.
Lemma 6. Function g satisfies the following: (i) g(0) ≥ 0. (ii) fa(S) is continuous and monotonically
decreasing in a, ∀S ⊆ A′, therefore g is continuous and monotonically decreasing. (iii) ∃ah ≥ 0 a rational
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number of polynomial size such that g(ah) ≤ 0, and g has a zero of polynomial-size. (iv) Given a set
S ⊆ A′, if fa(S) > 0 and fa′(S) < 0 for a′ > a > 0, then ∃a∗ ≥ 0 such that fa∗(S) = 0 and such an a∗
can be computed by solving a feasibility linear program of polynomial-size.
Proof. Part (i) follows from Lemma 23. Part (ii) from Lemma 24 and the fact that g(a) is minimum
of fa(S) over all subsets S ⊂ A′. Minimum of continuously decreasing functions is also continuously
decreasing. Parts (iii) and (iv) from Lemma 25.
From Lemma 4 we know that at the end of NextSeg subroutine, when we have S∗ a maximal minimizer
of fa∗ and fa∗(S∗) = 0 then S∗ together with previous segments S1, . . . , Sk−1 will satisfy BB and SC at
(λnew,pnew). Next we show existence of appropriate  > 0 so that SC condition is satisfied for A′ \ S∗.
This will complete the missing part of Lemma 4.
Lemma 26. If a∗ > 0 such that g(a∗) = 0 and S∗ ⊂ A′ be maximal set such that fa∗(S∗) = 0, then
∃ > 0 rational of polynomial size such that SC condition is satisfied for A′ \ S∗ w.r.t. (λnew,pnew) where
λnew = λa
∗
+ 1, pnew is a valid optimal of DLP (λnew), and 1 is indicator vector of set A′ \ S∗.
Proof. To show SC for A′ \ S∗ w.r.t. (λnew,pnew), it suffices to show the following:
• fλnew,pnew(T ) ≥ 0, ∀T ⊂ A′ \ S∗.
Since S∗ was the maximal set where value of function fa∗ is 0 and minimum value of fa∗ is zero, we have
that for any S ⊂ A′ \ S∗, fa∗(S ∪ S∗) > 0. If there is an aT > a∗ such that faT (T ) = 0, then by applying
Lemma 25 it is a rational of polynomial size and can be computed by solving a linear program, otherwise
set aT =∞. Among all of these pick the least one, lets call it amin. It has to be strictly more than a∗.
LetA′′ = A′ \S∗, and fix set S ⊂ A′′. Let λˆ = λa∗ , Xˆ be an optimal allocation of LP (λˆ) whereA′′ \S
gets the best, then S, then S∗ and then rest of the segments. Let pˆ = pa∗ . Similar to Lemma 25 solve the
following LP to compute maximum value of aS such that m(S) ≥ payS when λis of only A′′ is increased.
Here b, δ and α variables, cSj =
∑
i∈S xˆij , ∀j, and λˆ = λˆi, i ∈ A′′.
max : b s.t.
∀j : ∑
i/∈A′′ xˆij > 0 or
∑
i xˆij < 1⇒ δj = 0
∀i ∈ A′′,∀j : xˆij > 0⇒ (λˆ+ b)dij =
∑
k aijkαik − pˆj − δj
∀i ∈ A′′,∀j : xˆij = 0⇒ (λˆ+ b)dij ≥
∑
k aijkαik − pˆj − δj
∀i ∈ A′′,∀k : ∑j aijkxˆij > rik ⇒ αik = 0∑
i∈S,j(pˆj + δj)c
S
j ≤ m(S)
b ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0, α ≥ 0
∀(i, j)
Clearly, b = 0, δj = 0, ∀j, and αik = αˆik, ∀(i, k) is feasible where (αˆ, pˆ) is the valid optimal solution of
LP (λˆ). If there is a finite optimal of the above LP then set aS = b otherwise set aS = ∞. Since aT > a∗,
we have aS > 0. Taking  to be less than aS , ∀S ⊂ A′′ will suffice, due to monotonicity of fa function
(Lemma 24). Since aSs are polynomial size, there is an  of polynomial size.
Putting everything together next we argue that at the end of the algorithm all the created segments satisfy
BB and SC w.r.t. (λcur,pcur). In other words, (λcur,pcur) are proper .
Lemma 27. The λcur and pcur obtained at the end of Algorithm 3 are proper (Definition 5).
Proof. Lemmas 4 and 26 imply that if at the beginning of kth call to NextSeg, w.r.t. (λcur,pcur),
S1, . . . , Sk−1 satisfiesBB and SC, andA′ satisfies SC, then at the end of it, w.r.t. (λnew,pnew), S1, . . . , Sk
satisfiesBB and SC, andA′\Sk satisfies SC. Applying this inductively, starting from k = 1 whereA′ = A,
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and resetting A′ = A′ \ Sk every time, the theorem follows. This is because if we made s calls in total to
NextSeg forming segments S1, . . . , Ss, and A′ = ∅ at the end, then all s segments satisfy BB and SC
w.r.t. (λcur,pcur) at the end. Thus (λcur,pcur) are proper .
Next we show correctness of Algorithm 3 using Lemmas 2, 6 and 27, and Theorem 3, and the next
theorem follows.
Theorem 6. Given a marketM satisfying extensibility and sufficient demand, Algorithm 3 returns its equi-
librium allocation and prices in time polynomial in the size of the bit description ofM.
Proof. The fact that if Algorithm 3 terminates in polynomial time then it returns equilibrium allocation and
prices of marketM follows from Lemmas 27 and 2, and Theorem 3.
The question is why should the algorithm terminate, and that too in polynomial-time. Note that, every
call to NextSeg reduces size of active set of agents. Therefore, if the instance has n agents then algorithm
makes at most n calls to NextSeg. Subroutine NextSeg does binary search for value of a between 0 and a
polynomial-sized rational. In each iteration of binary search it minimizes a submodular function, and in each
call to the submodular function we will be solving at most constantly many linear programs of polynomial
size. Thus submodular minimization can be done in polynomial time. Due to Lemma 6 and in particular
Lemma 25 value of awhere g(a) becomes zero for some set is rational of polynomial-size. Hence overall the
binary search has to terminate in polynomial time. The next loop again takes at most O(n) iterations, with
sub-modular minimization in each. Thus the NextSeg subroutine terminates in polynomial-time. Finding
allocation satisfying Budget constraint(i) of all the agents i ∈ A at the end of the algorithm, given prices
pcur and λ values λcur is equivalent to solving the feasibility linear program (3). Thus, overall the algorithm
terminates in polynomial time.
We get our main result using Theorem 6.
Theorem 2. [Extensibility and sufficient demand implies polynomial time algorithm] There is a polynomial
time algorithm that computes a market equilibrium allocation X and prices p for any market M that
satisfies extensibility and sufficient demand.
G Fairness and Incentive Compatibility Properties
In this section we show fairness properties of our general model, and incentive compatibility properties
of our algorithm as a mechanism in scheduling application. Yet another utility model is that of quasi-
linear utilities, where the agent also specifies an “exchange rate” between delay and payments, and wants to
minimize a linear combination of the two. We show in Section G.3 that for such a utility model there is no
IC mechanism that is also Pareto optimal and anonymous, even with a single good and two agents.
G.1 Fairness Properties
The first welfare theorem for traditional market models says that at equilibrium the utility vector of agents is
Pareto-optimal among utility vectors at all possible feasible allocations. We first show similar result for our
markets that satisfy mild condition of sufficient demand (see Definition 4). For our model the set of feasible
delay cost vectors are
D = {(delay1(X), . . . , delayn(X)) | xi is feasible in CC(i) for each agent i ∈ A,
and X satisfies Supply constraints for each good j ∈ G}
Theorem 7. Given marketM satisfying sufficient demand, the delay cost vector at any of its equilibrium is
Pareto-optimal in set D.
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Proof. Let (X∗,p∗) be an equilibrium. Using Lemma 19 we know that for some vector λ∗ > 0, X∗ is a
solution of LP (λ∗). Let d∗i = delayi(X
∗). If there is d ∈ D such that di ≤ d∗i , ∀i ∈ A with at least one
strict inequality, then the allocation corresponding to d is feasible in LP (λ∗) and would give strictly lower
objective value, a contradiction.
The next theorem establishes envy-freeness for the general model and follows directly from the equilib-
rium condition that every agent demands an optimal bundle at given prices.
Theorem 8. Equilibrium allocation of a given marketM is envy-free.
Next we show that at equilibrium each agent gets a “fair share”: the equilibrium allocation Pareto-
dominates an “equal share” allocation, where each agent gets an equal amount of each resource. This
property is also known as sharing incentive in the scheduling literature [29].
Theorem 9. Given a marketM, let X be an allocation where agent i gets mi∑
i∈Ami
amount of each good,
i.e., xij = mi∑
i∈Ami
, ∀i ∈ A,∀j ∈ G. Then at any equilibrium (X∗,p∗) of market M, delayi(X∗) ≤
delayi(X), ∀i ∈ A.
Proof. At equilibrium under-sold goods have price zero, and no agent spends more than its budget. This
gives ∑
i,j
x∗ijp
∗
j ≤
∑
i
mi ⇒
∑
j
p∗j
∑
i
x∗ij ≤
∑
i
mi ⇒
∑
j
p∗j ≤
∑
i
mi
.
Therefore, for agent i, bundlexi where amount of every good is exactly mi∑
i∈Ami
costs money
∑
j xijp
∗
j =
mi∑
imi
∑
j p
∗
j ≤ mi. Thus, it is affordable at prices p∗. However, she preferred x∗i instead, which implies
either x′i is not feasible in CC(i) in which case delayi(x
′
i) is infinity, or she prefers x
∗
i to x
′
i. In either case
we get delayi(X
∗) ≤ delayi(X).
G.2 Scheduling: Algorithm as a Truthful Mechanism
Market based mechanisms are usually not (dominant strategy) incentive compatible (IC), except in the large
market assumption where each individual agent is too small to influence the price, and therefore can be
assumed to act as a price taker. Somewhat surprisingly, we can show IC, in a certain sense, of the market
based mechanism for the special case of our market that corresponds to the scheduling setting presented in
Section 3, and its generalization described in 2.3 with multiple machine types.
We show that our market based mechanism is IC in the following sense: non-truthful reporting of mi
and riks can never result in an allocation with a lower delay cost. A small modification to the payments,
keeping the allocation the same, makes the entire mechanism incentive compatible for the setting in which
agents want to first minimize their delay and subject to that, minimize their payments.
The first incentive compatibility assumes that utility of the agents is only the delay, and does not depend
on the money spent (or saved). Such utility functions have been considered in the context of online advertis-
ing [5, 23, 42]. It is a reflection of the fact that companies often have a given budget for procuring compute
resources, and the agents acting on their behalf really have no incentive to save any part of this budget. Our
model could also be applied to scenarios with virtual currency in which case the agents truly don’t have any
incentive to minimize payments.
The second incentive compatibility does take payments into account, but gives a strict preference to
delay over payments. Such preferences are also seen in the online advertising world, where advertisers want
as many clicks as possible, and only then want to minimize payments. The modifications required for this
are minimal, and essentially change the payment from a “first price” to a “second price” wherever required.
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Yet another utility model is that of quasi-linear utilities, where the agent also specifies an “exchange rate”
between delay and payments, and wants to minimize a linear combination of the two. We show in Section
G.3 that for such a utility model there is no IC mechanism that is also Pareto optimal and anonymous, even
with a single good and two agents. Pareto optimality is a benign notion of optimality that has been used
as a benchmark for designing combinatorial auctions with budget constraints [21, 24, 30]. Anonymity is
also a reasonable restriction, which disallows favoring any agent based on the identity. In the face of this
impossibility, our mechanism offers an attractive alternative.
G.2.1 Pure delay minimization
Suppose that there are j independent copies of the basic scheduling setting in Section 3, with the requirement
of agent i for the jth copy being rik. In this section we show that our algorithm is actually IC, i.e., the agents
have no incentive to misreport mis or riks, assuming that agents only want to minimize their delay cost and
don’t care about their payments as long as they are within the budgets. Note that reporting lower mi or
higher rik are the only possible types of misreport. Fixing preferences of all agents except agent i, consider
two runs of the algorithm, one where agent i is truthful and another where she misreports her preferences.
In particular, say agent i either reports a lower budget m′i, and/or a higher requirements r
′
ik for good j.
Consider the first iteration in which the two runs differ, and let (S1, λ1) and (S2, λ2) be the segments
found respectively in the truthful and non-truthful runs in this iteration. For any λ, any p, and any set S that
does not contain i, fp,λ(S) remains the same between the two runs; for any set S that contains i, fp,λ(S)
is strictly smaller in the non-truthful run. Hence, i does not belong to any of the segments found in earlier
iterations, and S2 necessarily contains i.7 Further, λ2 < λ1.
Let A′ be the set of agents who are not in one of the segments found prior to the current iteration. By
definition A′ is the same for both the runs, and includes i, as argued in the previous paragraph. Let X1 and
X2 be respectively the allocations output by the algorithm for the truthful and the non-truthful runs. We will
show the existence of a weakly feasible allocation X ′ such that (1) For every agent i′ ∈ A′, i′ 6= i, his delay
in X ′ is no higher than his delay in X1, and (2) For agent i, his allocation in X ′ is the same as his allocation
in X2.
This implies that i is no better off in the non-truthful run, because of the following reasoning. The total
delay of all the agents in A′ is minimized in X1, therefore the total delay of all the agents in A′ cannot be
lower in allocation X ′, even when the delay for agent i is calculated using only his actual requirements.
Since no other agent has a higher delay in X ′, it is impossible for i to get a lower delay.
It remains to show the existence of X ′ as claimed. We define X ′ differently based on whether the agent
is in S2 or not.
Case 1: i′ ∈ S2: In this case, x′i′ = x2i′ . This satisfies the second requirement since i ∈ S2. Since λ2 < λ1,
every agent in S2 faces a smaller price, for every copy j and every time slot in which she is allocated.
For i′ 6= i, given the same budget and the same requirements, this actually implies that her delay in
X2 is strictly smaller than her delay in X1.
Case 2: i′ /∈ S2: In this case, we first start with the allocation X1, in the slots [1, rj(B \ S2)] for each
copy j. Note that these slots have not been allocated at all in Case 1. Consider the total deficit after
this allocation. This must be equal to the total amount of slots in [1, rj(B \ S2)] that are allocated to
agents in S2 by X1, because of feasibility of X1. Now re-allocate these empty slots in [1, rj(B \S2)]
to make up for the remaining requirement of these agents, and note that this can only lower the delay.
7Consider the possibilities where i /∈ S2 and note that S2 cannot be the minimizer in the non-truthful run given that S1 is the
minimizer in the truthful run.
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G.2.2 Secondary preference for payments
In this section, we consider the utility model where an agent wants to first minimize her flow-time, and
subject to that, wants to further minimize her payments. We keep the same allocation as Algorithm 1, but
change the payments of some agents, and show that this is IC.
We first define the set of agents whose payments will be modified. Recall that Algorithm 1 outputs a
sequence of segments, where each segment corresponds to a pair (λ, S). Call an agent marginal if he gets
the latest slots in his segment. This includes agents who are in singleton segments, as well as agents who
just happen to get such an allocation even though they are in a segment with other agents. We modify the
payments of only the marginal agents; all non-marginal agents pay their budget.
Lemma 28. Any non-marginal agent gets a strictly higher delay cost for any misreport of his information.
Proof. Consider the proof of incentive compatibility for only delay cost minimization in Section G.2.1,
and the notation therein. Note that if S2 6= {i′}, then the delay cost of i′ strictly increases. Now suppose
S2 = {i′}. In the new allocation f2, agent i′ gets the latest slots among all agents in B. Since i′ is not a
marginal agent, he was getting a strictly better allocation in f1, and the lemma follows.
This shows that the mechanism is IC for non-marginal agents, even with their payments equal to the
budgets.
We now define the modification to payments for marginal agents. As in Section G.2.1, misreports
can still not get a better delay cost for marginal agents, since the allocation remains the same. The only
possibility is that misreporting can decrease payments, while keeping the delay cost the same. Marginal
agents can decrease their budgets, still get the same allocation, and pay less in the equilibrium payment.
This has a limit; at some lower budget declaration, they get “merged” with a previous segment, and any
further lowering of the budget will strictly lower their delay cost. The payment of a marginal agent is
defined to be the infimum of all budget declarations for which the lower segments are unaltered, i.e., the run
of the algorithm up to the previous segment remains unchanged.
We now argue that this mechanism is IC, for marginal agents. We only need to consider misreports that
don’t change the allocation, since those that do only give a higher delay cost. Among these, misreporting the
budget clearly has no effect on the payment. Finally, we argue that reporting a higher rik can only lead to a
higher payment. This is because the budget at which the agent merges with the previous segment happens
at a higher value, as can be seen from the formula for λS .
G.3 Quasi Linear Utility Model
In this section we consider a quasi linear utility model for the agents. In this model, agents can choose to
tradeoff payment for delay cost, as specified by an “exchange rate”, denoted by ηi, for agent i. We consider
the design of incentive compatible (IC) auctions, that are also Pareto optimal. In the related literature of IC
auctions for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints, this has been adopted as the standard notion of
optimality. The usual notion of social welfare is ill fitted for the case of budgets.8
As in Section 2 let the allocation of agent i for good j denoted by xij , but now we don’t have prices
for the slots. Instead we simply have a payment for each agent, denoted by payment(i) for agent i. The
allocation and the payments are together called the outcome of the auction. Agent i now wants to minimize
the objective ∑
j
dijxij + ηipayment(i).
8Of course, the revenue objective is also widely considered, and continues to make sense even in the presence of budgets.
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A type of an agent is its budget mi, its covering constraints CC(i), and its ηi. An auction is (dominant
strategy) IC if for any agent, misreporting its type does not lead to an outcome with a lower objective, no
matter what the other agents report. An outcome is Pareto optimal if for no other outcome,
1. all agents, including the auctioneer, are at least as well off as in the given outcome, and
2. at least one agent is strictly better off.
The auctioneer’s objective is to simply maximize the sum of all the payments.
We also restrict the auction to be anonymous, which means that the auction cannot rely on the identity
of the agents. Formally, an auction is anonymous if it is invariant under all permutations of agent identities.
The main result of this section is an impossibility.
Theorem 10. There is no IC, Pareto optimal, and anonymous auction for our scheduling problem with quasi
linear utilities, for the case of a single good and two agents.
Since a single good and two agents is the most basic case, an impossibility follows for all generalizations
as well.
The theorem follows from a reduction to a combinatorial auction with additive valuations, and an impos-
sibility result of Dobzinski et al. [21]. Consider an auction for a single divisible item, with budget constraints.
Agent i has valuation of vi per unit quantity of the item, and a budget mi. The outcome of the auction is an
allocation xi and payment payment(i) for agent i, such that
∑
i xi ≤ 1 and xi ∈ [0, 1]. The utility of agent
i is vixi − payment(i), and the budget constraint as before is that pi ≤ mi. IC and Pareto optimality are as
before, and we need an additional notion of individual rationality (IR): vixi − payment(i) ≥ 0. Dobzinski
et al. [21] showed the following impossibility.
Theorem 11 (Dobzinski et al. [21] ). There is no IC, Pareto optimal, IR and anonymous auction for auc-
tioning a single divisible good to 2 agents with budget constraints.
of Theorem 10. Consider an instance of the scheduling problem of Section 3 with a single machine and two
agents, where each agent requires 1 unit of the good. Pareto optimality implies that goods are not wasted,
so the entire first two slots are completely allocated. If agent i gets xi units of the slot t = 1, then his delay
cost is xi + 2(1− xi). His objective is then
xi + 2(1− xi) + ηipayment(i) = 2− ηi
(
1
ηi
xi − payment(i)
)
.
Minimizing this objective is equivalent to maximizing 1ηixi − payment(i), which is exactly as in the single
divisible good auction with vi = 1ηi . We also show that the IC constraint for the scheduling problem implies
the IR constraint for the divisible good case. If the IR constraint is violated, i.e., 1ηixi < payment(i), then
the value of the objective of agent i for this outcome is strictly smaller than 2. Then the agent is better off
stating a budget of 0. This will force his payment to 0. The worst delay cost he can get is 2, so his total
objective value is 2.
Therefore, an IC, Pareto optimal, and anonymous auction for our scheduling problem implies an IC,
Pareto optimal, IR, and anonymous auction for the divisible good case, and the theorem follows.
44
